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I. INTRODUCTION
"We don't ration steaks, or Lincoln Continentals or Pi-
casso drawings. If you want them, you have to get them
the old fashioned way - you have to pay for them." -
Alfred Kahn.'
AIR TRAFFIC HAS increased considerably since the
A Airline Deregulation Act of 1979.2 Although
problems of allocating airport resources existed before
economic deregulation, 3 the increase in traffic after dereg-
ulation has made the problem more acute.4 The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
before its demise, 5 have responded in a variety of ways.
I Alfred Kahn (1984) (unpublished monograph).
2 See STAFF REPORT, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
COMPETITION AND THE AIRLINES: AN EVALUATION OF DEREGULATION 33, Fig. 1.3
(1982) [hereinafter cited as CAB STAFF REPORT]. M. BRENNER, J. LEET & E.
SCHOOT, AIRLINE DEREGULATION 18, Table 4 (1985) indicated that between 1978
and 1983, truck revenue-passenger miles increased by 7.11%. Locals increased
91.5%, intrastate increased 123.7%, Alaska/Hawaii by 47.1%, and other carriers
increased by 20.3%. Id.
I See generally Levine, Landing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 79 (1969). As early as 1968, the FAA was compelled to limit takeoffs and
landings at high-density airports. Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Amend-
ment No. 93-13, effective April 27, 1969, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968) (codified as
amended at 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.121 -.133 (1985) [hereinafter cited as FAR Amend-
ment 93-13].
4 See generally STAFF REPORT, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, AIRPORT ACCESS
PROBLEMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SLOT REGULATION BY THE FAA (1983) [herein-
after referred to as FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE]; Report of the Airport
Task Force, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983) [hereinafter referred
to as AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT]; Government Policies on the Transfer of Operating Rights
Granted By the Federal Government, Particularly Certificates of Public Convenience and Ne-
cessity and Airport Slots, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as
AVIATION HEARINGS] (particularly the testimony of M. Cohen at 7; R. Cohn, gen-
eral counsel for People Express, at 71; and R. Aaronson, Director of Aviation, the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, at 576).
The CAB ceased to exist as an independent entity in January, 1985, and its
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They established quotas on the number of Instrument
Flight Rule reservations per hour for specified high-den-
sity airports, 6 allowed slot exchanges, 7 permitted experi-
mental slot sales8 (and then withdrew that permission),9
and provided antitrust exemptions for airport scheduling
committees and agreements.'" DOT/FAA also has allo-
cated slots administratively when scheduling committees
have deadlocked. t
remaining functions not related to economic regulation were transferred to the
Department of Transportation (DOT). See 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982). For a com-
prehensive survey of the events leading up to the CAB's demise, see generally
Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board- Opening Wide the Floodgates
of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91 (1979).
6 FAR Amendment 93-13, supra note 3; see 14 C.F.R. § 93.121-.133 (1985).
7 47 Fed. Reg. 25,508 (1982).
8 47 Fed. Reg. 19,989 (1982).
47 Fed. Reg. 25,508 (1982).
10 See, e.g., Application for Discussion Authority and Prior Approval of Carrier
Agreements to Integrate Schedules, CAB Order No. 84-10-120 at 8 (Oct. 25,
1984); Petition of the Regional Carrier Scheduling Comm. for Approval of and
Antitrust Immunity for an Agreement to Establish a Regional Carrier Scheduling
Comm. under §§ 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, CAB Order No. 84-9-
10 at 2 (Sept. 7, 1984); Petition of Regional Carrier Scheduling Comm., CAB
Order No. 84-8-24 at 1 (Aug. 6, 1984); Petition of Regional Air Carriers, CAB
Order No. 84-7-41 at 3 (July 13, 1984); Petition of Various Commuter Air Carri-
ers, CAB Order No. 83-3-150 at 2 (Mar. 29, 1983); Application of Air Transp.
Ass'n of Am., CAB Order No. 82-3-143 at 1 (Mar. 25, 1982); Requests of Air
Florida, Inc. and the Washington Nat'l Commuter Airlines Ass'n, CAB Order No.
82-1-50 at 2 (Jan. 12, 1982); Petition of Dulles Policy Task Force, CAB Order No.
81-12-49 at 3 (Dec. 9, 1981); Request of the Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., CAB Order
No. 81-10-162 at 3 (Oct. 27, 1981); Application of the Airline Scheduling Comm.,
CAB Order No. 80-9-148 at 9 (Sept. 24, 1980); Order Approving Agreement,
CAB Order No. 69-2-52 at 2 (Feb. 12, 1969).
" The broad powers of the FAA to administratively allocate slots are set forth
in the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a) (1982):
The Secretary of Transportation is authorized and directed to de-
velop plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the
navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use
of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limita-
tions as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of air-
craft and the efficient utilization of such airspace. He may modify or
revoke such assignment when required in the public interest.
Additional authorization is set forth in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(c):
The Secretary of Transportation is further authorized and directed
to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of
aircraft, for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft,
for the protection of persons and property on the ground, and for
the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as
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Effective April 1, 1986, an FAA final rule' 2 (the "Buy-
Sell" Rule) permits airline carriers and commuter opera-
tors to sell slots for any consideration at four of the Na-
tion's high-density airports. Specifically, this new Buy-Sell
Rule provides separate slot pools for air carriers, com-
muters, and other operators.' 3 Air carriers holding slots
on December 16, 1985, are "grandfathered,"'14 and may
buy, sell, trade, or lease those slots beginning April 1,
1986.'1 International slots are treated specially and their
transfer is restricted.' 6 Slots not used at least 65% of the
time must be returned to the FAA and, along with other
newly available slots, distributed by lottery. 7  General
to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collision
between aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and
airborne objects.
12 FAR Amendment 93-49, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180 (1985) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 93) [hereinafter cited as FAR Amendment 93-49]; see also FAA Notice
84-7, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,806 (1984); FAA Notice 84-6, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,788 (1984);
FAA Notice 80-16, 45 Fed. Reg. 71,236 (1980). Proposals to further modify FAA
slot allocation procedures currently are pending in Congress. See H.R. 4824, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 5398, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
13 FAR Amendment 93-49, supra note 12.
14 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,184 (1985):
With respect to the effect of "grandfathering" on new entrants,
several other provisions of the rule mitigate the initial effects and
will act to eliminate these effects over time. First, the adoption of
the buy-sell rule itself permits new entrants to acquire slots on the
same basis as incumbents seeking additional slots. This would allow
new entrants (some of which have waited for some time) to obtain
immediate access at a high density airport. Second, the lottery
mechanism adopted for the allocation of new, returned, or otherwise
unallocated slots provides a set-aside of 15 percent of the available
slots for new entrants.
Id. at 52,182.
16 Id. at 52,187:
The Department of State [DOS] commented that bilateral agree-
ments would probably not be violated if foreign carriers were given
a fair and equal opportunity to compete with domestic carriers for
available slots. DOS was concerned, however, that the larger scale
of activity of domestic carriers at the high density airports might give
them at least an initial unfair advantage. DOS recommended that
the buy/sell approach be confined at first to domestic operations to
gain experience and to make any needed adjustments before adapt-
ing the rule to include international operations.
1 Id at 52,193:
Initially, a random lottery would be held to determine the order in
which carriers will select slots. Separate lotteries will be held on an
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Aviation slots are not affected.' 8 Finally, slots may be re-
called by the FAA for "operational reasons" and are not
considered "proprietary rights," despite the permission
to buy and sell.' 9
Although a wide spectrum of interests supported the
Buy-Sell Rule at the FAA's public hearings, opponents
voiced four basic objections. These parties argued that
the Rule would (1) give an undeserved "windfall" to in-
cumbents20 ; (2) increase air fares2'; (3) cause slots used
for service to small communities to be outbid by carriers
seeking the slots for long distance use and more lucrative
routes22 ; and (4) create anticompetitive incentives for
large carriers to outbid smaller carriers for slots. 23
Armed with an FTC Economic Staff Report24 and an
economic analysis prepared by the Department of Justice
(DOJ),25 the FAA responded in summary as follows: (1)
The economic scarcity value of the slots exists regardless
airport-by-airport basis for commuter operators and for air carriers.
Unlike the lotteries for slot withdrawal purposes (which will be con-
ducted only once for air carrier and commuter operator slots for
each high density airport), lotteries for allocation purposes will be
conducted whenever the agency determines that a sufficient number
of slots are available for allocation.
as Id. at 52,182.
,9 Id. The Rule also makes it clear that the FAA in no way intends that "buy-
sell" be construed to allow airport proprietors to sell or restrict slots:
A large group of commenters, including the Joint Commenters,
Delta, People Express and Southern Jersey Airways were concerned
that airport proprietors might misinterpret a buy-sell rule as grant-
ing them authority to sell slots on their own. The Massachusetts Port
Authority and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as-
serted that proprietors should be able to regulate local resources
through slot restrictions. The Department's position in this manner
remains that the FAA retains sole jurisdiction over the-Nation's air-
space, and that nothing in this rule should be construed to authorize
a sale of slots by any airport authority.
Id. at 52,189.




24 CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2.
25 Comments of the United States Department of Justice, Before the
FAA/DOT, Docket No. 24,110 (Aug. 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited as DOJ
Comments].
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of Buy-Sell and, therefore, any "windfall" was created at
the time the slots were originally awarded and not by Buy-
Sell. 6 (2) Airfares would not increase since, as economic
studies have shown, 27 existing fares already reflect the
scarcity value of the slots. In fact, airfares would decrease
due to more efficient slot use and a substantial reduction
in delays now costing carriers and their customers mil-
lions of dollars per day. 28 (3) Service to small communi-
ties is protected by the Essential Air Service Program29
26 FAR Amendment 93-49, supra note 12. As the FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT
TASK FORCE, supra note 4, explains:
[T]he prices which would be paid for slots if a market existed would
only be a reflection of the value of the existing scarcity of slots. That
scarcity is not created by the slot market, it is created by the FAA's
restriction on the number of landings permitted at an airport, at
least during some parts of the day."
Id. at 32.
27 FAR Amendment 93-49, supra note 12, 50 Fed. Reg. at 52,184:
As an example, FTC cites from an FTC staff report which found
that in the first quarter of 1981, fares in slot-constrained markets
were two to five percent higher than in other markets. FTC con-
cluded that even if carriers were to acquire those slots at their mar-
ket value (rather than for free, as under the existing rule), the
average fare level would not rise. If a carrier's fare in a slot-con-
strained market did rise, it would indicate that the carrier had not
been charging a profit-maximizing fare prior to buy-sell, which is un-
likely. FTC further noted that the above conclusion applied to the
average of all fares, and that there were circumstances which could
result in the increase in fares in some markets and the decrease of
fares in others.
28 Id. at 52,185:
American Airlines commented that fares are not always directly
related to costs. American also noted that fares might actually be
lowered as a result of buy-sell, because the market in slots would
increase economic efficiency and allow a more productive use of
slots. Other comments pointed out that since the expenditures for
slots would only be a small part of overall costs, those expenditures
would not have a significant effect on ticket prices.
29 Id. at 52,186:
The Joint Commenters stated that the fear is unfounded that a
buy/sell rule would result in shifting of service to small communities
from the high density airports, or that slots would be used only with
large aircraft. They cite numerous examples of carriers serving
small communities and suggest that that will continue. In fact, they
suggest that "without buy/sell some small and medium community
services might be adversely affected.". . . American cites the recent
expansion of service to smaller communities as proof that new ser-
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and the Rule's reservation of slots for commuter carriers.
The hub-spoke system requires short-haul routes from
the hub, and slots for such purposes will be highly valued
and therefore purchased at competitive prices. Slot sales
also permit small communities to purchase or lease slots
which otherwise might be unobtainable.3 0 (4) Smaller car-
riers will not necessarily be outbid by larger carriers, since
slot sales can be financed. Lenders will be more likely and
more willing to lend money for a slot to a carrier making
profitable use of a slot. Thus, if anything, Buy-Sell tends
to favor smaller, low-cost airlines over some larger carri-
ers."' (Several new entrants under an experimental slot
sale program in 1982 obtained twenty-six slots that they
had been seeking unsuccessfully prior to that time.)3 2
The "lose it or use it" provision of the Rule, combined
vice will be directed towards small communities to "tap" new mar-
kets and feed the established long-haul routes.
Protection and development of service to smaller communities is
also achieved by the provision for separate treatment of slots used
for service to certain communities under the Essential Air Service
(EAS) Program.
so Id.: "DOJ commented that smaller communities may act on their own to pre-
serve air service by entering into contractual agreements with carriers holding
slots or by purchasing slots and leasing them to carriers. This rule would allow
such arrangements."
3, Id. at 52,185:
The FTC observed that the motivation to purchase in a slot mar-
ket will be the expectation of providing relatively high-value flights
and not simply the availability of cash on hand. If a smaller carrier
can obtain higher profitability from an additional operation than can
a larger carrier, the smaller carrier should be able to offer a higher
purchase price and obtain the slot, even if financing is required. The
size of a carrier is not necessarily related to the ability to finance
purchases. FTC notes that smaller carriers such as People Express
have been able to finance large equipment purchases and should
have no more trouble financing slot purchases. Financing should be
facilitated by the fact that slots are non-depreciating and readily
transferable.
2 Id.:
CEA cites the examples of new entrants being able to gain access
during the limited buy-sell experiment conducted with interim oper-
ations plan slots in 1982. They cite the example in which one carrier
acquired 26 slots at that time. The price of the slots did not consti-
tute a barrier to entry or to subsequent profitable operation.
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with antitrust enforcement, would prevent anticompeti-
tive behavior in buying slots to keep out a competitor.
In sum, the FAA maintained that under Buy-Sell, bene-
fits would accrue "from the ability to liquidate a slot at a
price higher than the value to the using carrier, ''3 or from
the opportunity "to acquire a slot at a price which will
permit a return on investment higher than the next pref-
erable investment alternative, ' ' 34 thereby increasing air
carrier profit by "$100,000 to $130,000 per day."135 The
FAA further opined that new entrants would benefit from
being able to obtain access,36 that the government would
benefit through relief from responsibility for monitoring
and scheduling benefits, 7 and that society would benefit
from improved efficiency in air carrier operations.3 8
This article analyzes the economic and legal conse-
quences of the FAA Buy-Sell Rule. As a background to
this analysis, Part II briefly reviews the history and pur-
poses of airline deregulation. Part III discusses airport ac-
cess restrictions as a threat to free entry and,
consequently, to airline deregulation. Parts IV and V re-
view the economic and legal status of existing airport re-
sources so that slot allocation may be viewed in the
broader context of airport resources. (It will be shown,
for example, that the Buy-Sell Rule fails to address entry
at the most critical point of bottleneck, namely terminal
space and gates.) Part VI surveys existing and proposed
3s Id. at 52,194.
34 Id.
35 Id.
.6 See supra note 32.
,7 Id. at 52,184:
The Department believes that the rule minimizes the need for gov-
ernment intervention in the continuing allocation and distribution
of slots. Because carrier agreement on schedules, as the scheduling
committees now operate, is not required, there will no longer be
deadlocks in the allocation process.
s8 Id. at 52,185:
An unrestricted market in slots will permit a new entrant to obtain
marginally profitable slots from one carrier at a price which will al-
low the new entrant to compete in a market in which another carrier
is maintaining a price above average cost.
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means of airport resource allocation so that alternative
methods may be compared to Buy-Sell. Part VII reviews
possible antitrust enforcement under Buy-Sell. Finally,
Part VIII concludes that, while the benefits of Buy-Sell
outweigh the disadvantages of existing methods, the
threat of anticompetitive behavior under Buy-Sell is sub-
stantial and cannot be cured solely by antitrust enforce-
ment. This article, therefore, proposes a modification to
Buy-Sell that will reduce substantially the threat of an-
ticompetitive behavior under Buy-Sell. This modification
includes the integration of variable landing fees and a
supplemental efficiency-bidding system in lieu of a lottery
for recaptured slots.
II. AIRLINE ECONOMIC DEREGULATION (1978-1985)
The FAA Buy-Sell Rule must be considered in the
broader context of the policies and purpose of the Airline
Deregulation Act. The benefits of airline economic de-
regulation over the past seven years have been widely rec-
ognized. 9 It has been suggested that the deregulatory
experience has fully vindicated President John F. Ken-
nedy's call, in his 1962 Transportation Message, for
"greater reliance on the forces of competition and less re-
liance on the restraints of regulation. '40
Airline deregulation was a victory for the economic the-
oreticians. 4 Critics resisted deregulation on the theory
that it would bring economic disaster to the industry,4 2
-9 See, e.g., Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 10
TRANSP. L.J. 101, 104-05 (1985).
40 Quoted in A. FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION REG-
ULATION at vii (1969).
41 See generally Anderson & Kraus, Quality of Service and the Demand for Air Travel,
63 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 533 (1980); Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151 (1972);
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976);
Schmatensee,"Comparative Stoic Properties of Regulated Airline Oligopolitics, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Smi. 565 (1971); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.
ECON. & MGrr. ScL 3 (1971); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?
The Case of Electricity, 5J.L. & EcON. 1 (1962).
42 See Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation - On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANSP. L.J.
1986]
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decrease service to small communities,43 result in industry
concentration, 44 and, eventually, oligopolization.4' Dereg-
ulation in large measure has proved the inaccuracy of
these predictions, as well as the invalidity of the public
interest rationale for regulation.46 Deregulation thus has
vindicated economists such as George Stigler, who postu-
lated that "every industry or occupation that has enough
political power to utilize the state will seek to control en-
try. ' '4  It has been noted, for example, that between 1960
and 1975, "the scholarly view of the regulatory process
changed from one of control of private behavior for the
benefit of the public to one of use of governmental pow-
ers for private or sectional gain. ' '48
Prior to airline deregulation in 1978, the airline indus-
try proved the truth of Stigler's hypothesis. In the years
329, 334-44 (1984), and authorities cited therein; see also Davis, The Great Airline
Disaster, Denver Post, Feb. 7, 1982, at ID, col. 1.
43 See generally, Comment, Section 419 of the Airline Deregulation Act: What Has Been
the Effect on Air Service to Small Communities?, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 151 (1981).
44 See Gibney, Continuing Airline Losses Predicted, Denver Post, June 21, 1982, at
3C, col. 1. Gibney quotes Braniff's Chief Executive Officer:
I think within five to seven years you will have no more than five [out
of a current eleven] trunk airlines. Then you will have a whole bunch
of Southwest Airlines-type carriers that start out from scratch and
work to keep costs in line. As decreed by the law of the jungle, only
the strong will survive.
Id.
4 Dempsey, supra note 42, at 345. Dempsey cites Rowen, Airlines Competing to the
Death, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1982, at A27, col. 2: "[T]he airline industry under
deregulation is on a course where competition is being wrung out by the creation
of an oligopoloy of a few remaining large airlines .... "
46 Several commentators reveal that regulations primarily tend to benefit the
industry regulated rather than the public. See, e.g., A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THE-
ORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); R. NOLL, GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR AND
PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY 12 (1976); Migue, Con-
trols Versus Subsidies in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 20 J.L. & ECON. 213, 215-16
(1977).
47 Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 6
(1971). Stigler considers two alternative views of regulation: (1) regulation for
the benefit of the public; and (2) regulation by vested interest groups through
coercive use of governmental power. The interest groups may employ political
machinery beneficial to that industry, but harmful to the public at large. See id.
48 Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 14 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 180 (1981).
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following its creation in 1938,' 9 the CAB, through its
power to grant certificates of "public convenience or ne-
cessity," 50 rigidly controlled entry.5" During this period
of heavy-handed regulation, not a single major carrier was
permitted into the industry.52 The only single significant
exception took the form of post-World War II entries by
local service carriers, who were granted certificates to re-
place trunks in providing subsidized service to small
communities.53
While several factors, such as the general inflation rate,
particular inflation rates (fuel, for example 54 ) recessionary
pressures, and technological advances, must be consid-
ered in an analysis of airline industry pricing, most studies
examining all these factors have concluded that regulation
created artificially inflated fares.5 5 The 1975 Kennedy
hearings revealed regulated fares ranging from 40% to
100% too high, costing consumers $3.5 billion in excess
fares. 56 These statistics reinforced an earlier study sug-
gesting that coach fares were 45% to 84% higher than
unregulated fares would be.
Under regulation, fares were based on the average costs
49 See Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
50 Id. at 980.
5' CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. This test put the burden of proof on
applicants to show new entry was in the public interest and would not harm an
incumbent airline. Since a new entrant had no proven track record to distinguish
its merits, it suffered a significant disadvantage in pressing its case.
52 As Professor Dempsey noted: "Between 1950 and 1974, the CAB received 79
applications from firms seeking to obtain operating authority to provide sched-
uled domestic service. None was granted." Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil
Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 115
(1979) (emphasis added).
53 CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
During the first four months of 1979, jet fuel costs increased by 867o. J.
MEYER, C. OSTER, I. MORGAN, B. BEARMAN & D. STRASSMAN, AIRLINE DEREGULA-
TION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE 163 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD PROJECT].
-- Id. at 25-27.
56 Oversight of the CAB Practices and Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
454 (1975).
57 Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance, 3 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT SCI.
399, 421 (1972).
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of the industry.58 The CAB focused on achieving a de-
sired rate of return for the industry, without regard for
the relationship between fares and costs in particular mar-
kets.5 9 This myopic policy produced many economic ill
effects similar to those that would result in a monopolized
industry. 60 The disparity between costs and fares forced
carriers in competitive markets to compete by offering
frills like "polynesian pubs" or the most free liquor.6 '
Inefficient carriers were rewarded with new routes to help
keep them afloat while efficient carriers were forced to as-
sume money-losing routes to serve the "public
interest."6 2
With such a perversion of market incentives, airlines
predictably did their best to discard such routes. As a re-
sult of this policy of cross-subsidization, 173 communities
lost their air service in the eighteen years before deregula-
tion,63 devastating those communities and making a
mockery of the "social benefit" rationale of regulation.
Deregulation generated dramatic effects. Despite fuel
price increases of 105% between March 1979 and March
1980,64 fares decreased in real terms on an overall basis
during that period.65 While some communities gained ser-
vice, and others lost it after deregulation, an exhaustive
independent study concluded that "as a group, small
communities (both small hubs and nonhubs) were receiv-
ing more scheduled airline service after deregulation than
58 See M. LAZARUS, AIRLINE PRICING, DEREGULATION AND UNITED'S FARE POLI-
CIES (1983).
59 CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 68. Even the introduction of discount
fares allowed only moderate flexibility for deviation from regulated fares. Id. at
69.
- See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 459-483 (8th ed. 1970).
o S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 200 (1982).
62 CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
6- A director of the Aviation Action Project founded by Ralph Nader observed:
"Between 1960 and 1977, the CAB allowed certificated airlines to abandon 179
communities across America - hardly a model of good, public-utility style regula-
tion." Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1983, at 27, col. 12.
- HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 54, at 163.
65 Id. at 71. The Harvard Faculty Project reported that real average fares de-
creased by 17% during the first years of deregulation. Id.
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before."' 66 In large part, this increase in service resulted
from more efficient use of more appropriately sized air-
craft on short hauls.67 Deregulation's liberalized entry
policy enabled fifteen newly formed jet-service airlines to
enter the industry by August 1983, more than replacing
the older, less efficient airlines that did not survive dereg-
ulation.68 The market share of the six biggest airlines
dropped from 70% to 62% during the period 1980-85.69
The airlines, who never earned the allowable rate of re-
turn in the decade before deregulation, increased their
profits by 50% in the very first year of deregulation.7 °
While the subsequent recession hit the airline industry
hard, by early 1984 the Airline Transport Association
(ATA) was predicting a one-half billion-dollar industry
profit for 1983. 7 1 In addition, airline employment has in-
creased during deregulation, even during the recession
years.72
Safety also has increased during deregulation, declining
from .10 fatal crashes per 100,000 takeoffs in 1978 to .08
in 1982. 7 3 More importantly, performance "indicators"
(accidents, injuries, FAA violations) have improved by
30% during the period.74 In sum, deregulation has
- Id. at 156.
67 See FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 26. The use of
smaller aircraft by commuters also substantially reduced community subsidy
levels. See HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 54, at 156-57.
- STAFF OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD DRAFT
REPORT 12 (1984) [hereinafter cited as CAB DRAFT REPORT].
-9 Interview with Bill Horn, American Transport Association (July 1, 1986).
70 Id. at 19-24.
71 USA Today, Jan. 9, 1984, at BI, col. 4. Despite mixed financial results in
1984, see Shrifin, Smaller U.S. Air Carriers Mark Mixed Financial Results in 1984, Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 22, 1985, at 39-41, optimism continued for 1985. Even
with one-hundred million dollar strike-related losses by United Airlines in the sec-
ond quarter of 1985, George W. James, president of Airlines Economics, Inc.,
predicted over one billion dollars in operating earnings for the year. Shrifin,
United Strike, Cost Containment Spur Second-Quarter Profit Increases, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 12, 1985, at 36.
72 Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1983, at 35, col. 1.
1- Id. Airlines have found that maintaining safety standards above those re-
quired by the FAA actually can cut maintenance costs. Id.
74 Id. The 1985 crashes of Air India, Japan Airline and the British Airways char-
ter aircraft obviously were not tied to deregulation in this country. Testimony
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served the needs of consumers, the airline industry, and
its employees.
III. AIRPORT ACCESS LIMITATION AS A THREAT TO
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
The foregoing summary of airline deregulation benefits
provides a necessary preface to discussion of one of three
significant threats to airline deregulation: the denial of
airport resources to new entrants. (The second and third
threats, not discussed here, consist of insufficiently con-
trolled mergers 75 and discriminatory use of airline reser-
vation computer systems? 6) The Buy-Sell Rule primarily
seeks to deal with this threat to access.
The benefits of airline deregulation have flowed princi-
pally from two factors: (1) free entry, and (2) freedom to
compete by price and route. The value of the second fac-
tor, however, depends upon the first. The lack of free en-
try reduces the incentive to compete by price. While a
reduced incentive to compete by price would be a lesser
concern in the heyday of regulation, survival now depends
upon providing the best service at the lowest cost to the
concerning the Delta Airlines crash at Dallas/Ft. Worth on August 2, 1985, indi-
cates that windshear probably caused that accident. North, Safety Board Hearings
Relate Events Leading to Delta L-O11 Crash, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 4, 1985,
at 32-33.
11 See, e.g., Brodley, Antitrust Policy Under Deregulation Airline Mergers and the Theory
of Contestable Market, 61 B.U.L. REV. 823 (1981); Carlton, Landes & Posner, Benefits
and Cost of Airline Mergers: A Case Study, 11 BELL J. ECON. 65 (1980); Cohen, The
Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 131 (1983); Eads,
Airline Competitive Conduct in a Less Regulated Environment: Implications for Antitrust, 28
ANTITRUST BULL. 159 (1983); Fulton, Texas International's Acquisition of Continental
Airlines: A Case Study of Airline Acquisition in the Age of CA.B. Deregulation, 14 Law. &
POL. INT. Bus. 245 (1982); Keyes, A Preliminary Appraisal of Merger Control Under the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 46J. AIR L. & COM. 71 (1980); Mega-Carriers Envi-
sioned, The Denver Post, July 9, 1985, at 2C, col. 1; North, Mergers, Bankruptcies
Shrink Ranks of Regional Carriers, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1984, at 32; See
also Hardaway, Airline Mergers Threaten Public, The Denver Post, Mar. 28, 1986, at
4B, col. 4.
76 United Apollo Ticketing System Shapes Tactics in Air Fare Battle, The Denver Post,
Feb. 18, 1986, at 2C, col. 1; Shrifin,Justice Will Weigh Suit Challenging Airlines Com-
puter Reservations, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 25, 1985, at 105; CAB Sunset Ends





What economic deregulation accomplished in the skies
can be undone by direct or indirect entry control at the
nation's airports. In economic terms, it makes no differ-
ence whether new entrants suffer exclusion by formal eco-
nomic regulation (as was done by the CAB in the years
1938-1978), or by indirect means under the patchwork
umbrella of "noise" restrictions, collusive "voluntary"
agreements of scheduling committees, or administrative
fiat. Entry control by any artificial means ultimately di-
minishes market forces and the benefits to be derived
therefrom.
Free entry is necessary to prevent predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing occurs when a large competitor at-
tempts to use its economic power to lower prices to a level
which it can absorb, but which bankrupts competitors.78
After the bankrupts leave the industry, the large competi-
tor can raise its fares without fear of challenge. Predatory
pricing thus involves absorption of short-term losses in
the hopes of reaping future excess profits. Predatory pric-
ing becomes irrational, however, in a free-entry market,
since a competitor easily can reappear later to prevent the
reaping of oligopoly profits. As one scholar notes, preda-
tory pricing can work only where the predatory firm en-
joys insurance of its own ability to absorb ruinous losses,
and protection by substantial barriers to re-entry by
competitors. 7
But if the importance of free entry to the continued
services of deregulation is widely recognized, the means
of achieving it at the airport level is not. The acute nature
of this problem stems from the fact that the experience of
economic deregulation provides few answers, since the
determining factors are different. Economic deregulation
has been successful in large part because it allowed so
77 See CAB DRAFr REPORT, supra note 68, at 27.
78 See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697-700 (1975).
79 S. BREYER, supra note 61, at 32.
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many new entrants into the industry. 80 Free entry has
changed the shape of the industry to fit more closely the
economist's definition of a competitive industry: an indus-
try where a sufficiently large number of individual sellers
exist to ensure that no one seller controls a percentage of
the total market large enough to allow manipulation of
the price of its product by restricting or expanding its own
production.8 Traditional market mechanisms such as
supply and demand work well when an industry ap-
proaches this market pattern, but tend to have misalloca-
tive characteristics when it does not.8 2 Thus, while many
of the benefits economic deregulation spawned were
achieved easily by simply eliminating the legal and admin-
istrative barriers to entry into the industry, current access
restrictions to airports continue to foster many of the
same economic ill effects the original administrative entry
barriers caused. Access restrictions reduce the number of
competitors, confronting incumbent carriers with a more
steeply declining demand curve; i.e., a market where the
incumbent controls a large enough percentage of the
market to affect fares by varying its own output.83 In a
market where an incumbent firm faces such a
nonhorizontal demand curve, profit maximization occurs
not at the most efficient social pricing level (i.e., where
price equals marginal cost), but rather at the point where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost.84 Because this re-
80 By 1981, eleven newly formed airlines providing jet service had entered the
industry. CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 125. The market share of the six
largest trunk carriers has eroded steadily since deregulation, from a 70% market
share in 1980 to a 62% market share in 1985. Wall St.J., Feb. 28, 1986, at 1, col.
6.
81 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 60, at 460. Conversely, "[i]mperfect competition
prevails in an industry or group of industries wherever the individual sellers are
imperfect competitors, facing their own nonhorizontal... [demand] curves and
thereby having some measure of control over price." Id. at 461.
82 Id. "The imperfect competitor is contriving to keep things a little scarce. He
is contriving to keep P [profit] above MC [marginal cost] because in that way he
sets MR [marginal revenue] = MC and thereby maximizes his profits. So society
does not get quite as much of A's good as it really wants in terms of what that
good really costs society [to] produce." Id. at 476.
- See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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sults in a price higher than marginal cost, optimum effi-
ciency goes unachieved because "society does not get
quite as much of [the firm's] good as it really wants in
terms of what that good really costs society [to] pro-
duce."8 5 Thus, in a controlled entry environment, each
firm facing an individual downward sloping demand curve
maximizes its profits at a price level which results in misal-
location of resources.
The nature of the entry control becomes irrelevant in
light of the foregoing analysis. Instead, entry control it-
self creates market conditions conducive to misallocative
price levels. The challenge lies in identifying a method of
allocation which distributes airport resources to those
firms who will use them most efficiently, and which has
minimum impact on free entry. The first step toward find-
ing the optimum method of allocation involves determi-
nation of a means for establishing the true scarcity value
of each airport resource.
IV. ECONOMIC VALUE OF AIRPORT RESOURCES
The 1986 FAA Buy-Sell Slot Rule was the result of in-
put from economists, lawyers, and members of the airline
industry. The Rule suffers, however, from a general lack
of cross-fertilization of ideas between lawyers and econo-
mists on the issue of airport resource allocation. In In re
Braniff Airways Inc. ,86 for example, the court determined
the property status of certain Braniff Airlines airport slots
in a bankruptcy proceeding. The court rejected Braniff's
characterization of the slots as property,87 on grounds
that the Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR's)88
establishing slots were "rules as defined in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act"8 9 and that slots established there-
85 P. SAMUELSON, supra note 60, at 476.
88 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
87 Id. at 942.
88 Id.
89 Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982) (including any "agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy" as a rule under the Administrative Procedure Act).
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under "do not lose their character as rules because they
modify airlines' claimed rights to slot allocation." 90 The
court characterized slots as "restrictions on the use of
property - airplanes; not property in themselves,"'" and
thus not within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.92
The court does not cite any economic studies or analyses
to support their conclusion that slots are not property,
nor does the opinion contain any indication that Braniff
presented an economic analysis of slot values to the court.
Economists rarely refer to legal authority when analyz-
ing an economic problem. For example, in a recent Bu-
reau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade
Commission, 93 there is not a single reference to a court
decision.94 (The report notes, however, that during the
FAA 1982 six-week slot sale experiment, over 190 slots
actually were sold on the open market for considerable
sums.9 5 The report goes on to explain, in economic
terms, why the prices paid for the slots reflected the value
of the existing slot scarcity. 96)
In short, lawyers and economists simply do not con-
verse on issues such as slot allocation (perhaps in part be-
cause they speak such different languages). The result has
been an unfortunate irony in which a court of law can re-
gard a slot as having no property status, while an econo-
mist characterizes the same slot as valuable property and
even purports to determine its precise market value.97
The following sections of this article review both the
700 F.2d at 942.
' Id. See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1321 (8th
Cir. 1981); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesade, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir.
1960) (FAA action limiting pilots' licenses to age 60 does not lose rulemaking
character because it changes pilots' claimed property rights).
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
9' FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE,, supra note 4, at 9-10.
Id. There are, however, references to administrative regulations. Id.
I ld.
Id. at 33.
97 Id. at 11: "For restricted hours, we estimated that slot prices would have
ranged from about $100,000 per year between noon and 1 in the afternoon to just
over $420,000 per year between 5 and 6 in the evening."
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economic status and legal status of airport resources, as
background to an analysis of the FAA Buy-Sell Rule as
well as alternative methods of airport resource allocation.
While the Rule itself relates only to "slots," it must be
evaluated in the broader context of airport resources, in-
cluding gates and terminal space.
A. Gates and Terminal Space
Any approach to ascertaining the economic value of an
airport gate or terminal facility must be largely theoreti-
cal. If gates were freely alienable, the simplest approach
would be to determine sale or lease prices on the open
market.98 In fact, however, utilization of many gate and
terminal spaces occurs pursuant to long-term leases en-
tered into with airport authorities before regulation.9"
Such long-term leases were not acquired through open-
market bidding, but were inextricably bound up with the
CAB-sanctioned airline cartel. To complicate matters fur-
ther, airlines in some cases own terminal facilities out-
right. Tied down by both long-term leases and airline
ownership, an airport's degree of control over facilities
varies widely.' 00 At some airports, airlines have "majority
98 The fact that sublease fees are often greatly in excess of the original base fee
indicates that the original fee did not reflect true market value. See AIRPORT Ac-
CEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 49-108.
- Id. at 54-58. To a large extent, therefore, economic regulation still rules
from the grave.
-O The AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT identified four basic types of airport owner-
ship and control:
(1) AIRLINE OWNED AND CONTROLLED - Ex: Most of the terminal
buildings at JFK; Eastern's terminal at Boston; South Terminal Cor-
poration at Boston, owned by American, Northwest, Pan Am, and
USAir.
(2) AIRPORT OWNED, BUT AIRLINE MANAGED AND CON-
TROLLED - Ex: Atlanta Terminal Corporation and New Delta Ter-
minal at O'Hare.
(3) THIRD PARTY OWNED AND LEASED BACK TO AIRLINE OR
AIRPORT: This is a new concept with varying degrees of control by
all three parties, depending on contractual arrangements. Ex:
Huntsville, Alabama (Hertz Corporation); National Terminal at JFK.
Due to recent tax incentives, these arrangements may become more
prevalent.
(4) AIRPORT OWNED AND AIRPORT CONTROLLED - The amount
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in interest" clauses in their written agreements with air-
port authorities, giving the airlines decision-making pow-
ers in critical areas of airport administration. 0 1 Airlines
also influence airport policy through "negotiating" com-
mittees representing airline interests.
Even if sufficient data existed, determining gate or ter-
minal value by simply estimating supply and demand val-
ues would not prove fully satisfactory since the seller or
lessor of such resources usually takes the form of either a
monopoly (the airport itself) or an oligopoly (i.e., an in-
cumbent airline) subleasing a gate or space. When gate
space has been subleased, it often has been for fees char-
acterized as "excessive."' 1 2 Sublease fees in excess of
value as determined by traditional marginal cost, 10 3 mar-
of airport control varies and is determined by contractual agree-
ments, industry practices, etc. Ex: A majority of U.S. airports.
Id. at 50.
lot Id. at 59. The AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT describes such clauses as follows:
In many airport leases, signatory carriers are given certain rights of
approval of airport decision making on specified matters, through
what is commonly called a "majority-in-interest" clause. The clause
is so named because specified airport proposals must be approved
by the signatory carriers constituting a "majority-in-interest." The
definition of a majority-in-interest varies from lease to lease, but is
usually cast in terms of a specified percentage of enplanements or
operations, such as 60% of passengers or operations.
Id.
102 Id. at 63:
Before deregulation, airlines did their own reallocation of terminal
space and only went to the airport owner when the reallocation
presented a very competitive situation that could not be worked out.
In most cases, the incumbent carrier has a tendency to hold on to its
existing space, but would consider a sublease to a new carrier. With-
out the airport having the right to reassign space, the requesting car-
rier must negotiate with an incumbent carrier, depending on the
availability of surplus space. The terms of these agreements vary
considerably and may or may not be subject to airport review or ap-
proval.
High fees and reserved rights to recover the space on short notice
have been the primary complaints. Only one airport surveyed had
the right to review and modify the terms of a sublease agreement.
103 "Marginal cost at any production level q is the extra cost of producing one
extra unit more (or less); it comes from subtracting total dollar costs of adjacent
output." P. SAMUELSON, supra note 60, at 429 (footnote omitted). Before deregu-
lation, most airports charged fees based on "equalized" rental rates, spreading
the cost of an additional unit over the cost of all previously constructed units. It
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ginal revenue, 104 or marginal utilityl °  approaches must
be considered in light of the Airport and Airway Develop-
ment Act of 1970, as re-codified in the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982.106 This act states that an air-
port "will be available for public use on fair and reason-
able terms."1 0 7
has been suggested, however, that this practice be revised to require that the en-
tire cost of the marginal unit be paid for by the carrier using it. See AIRPORT Ac-
CESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 66. See also Southern Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
428 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (failure to incorporate into formulas used in
determining rental values of space on concourses an element recognizing alleged
differences in value of various concourses was not unreasonable or
discriminatory).
- "'Marginal Revenue'[MR] is defined as the increment of Total Revenue
(plus or minus) that comes when we increase q by an increment of one unit. MR is
plus when demand is still elastic, minus when demand is inelastic, and just crosses
zero when demand turns from being elastic to being inelastic." P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 60, at 470.
105 "Marginal utility" here refers to the
law of diminishing marginal utility. As you consume more of the
same good, your total (psychological) utility increases. However, let
us use the term marginal utility, to refer to "the extra utility added
by one extra last unit of a good." Then, with successive new units of
the good, your total utility will grow at a slower and slower rate be-
cause of a fundamental tendency for your psychological ability to
appreciate more of the good to become less keen. This fact, that the
increments in total utility fall off, economists describe as follows:
As the amount consumed of a good increases, the marginal utility
of the good (or the extra utility added by its last unit) tends to
decrease.
Id. at 410.
106 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2201-25 (1982).
107 Id. The act provides that
the airport to which the project relates will be available for public
use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination,
including the requirement that (A) each air carrier using such airport
(whether as a tenant, nontenant, or subtenant of another air carrier
tenant) shall be subject to such nondiscriminatory and substantially
comparable rates, fees, rentals, and other charges and such nondis-
criminatory and substantially comparable rules, regulations, and
conditions as are applicable to all such air carriers which make simi-
lar use of such airport and which utilize similar facilities, subject to
reasonable classifications such as tenants or nontenants, and com-
bined passenger and cargo flights or all cargo flights, and such clas-
sification or status as tenant shall not be unreasonably withheld by
any airport provided an air carrier assumes obligations substantially
similar to those already imposed on tenant air carriers, and (B) each
fixed-based operator at any airport shall be subject to the same rates,
fees, rentals, and other charges as are uniformly applicable to all
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Traditional approaches to value determination for air-
port resources have failed to take into account the value
of denying entry to competitors. The consequences of
denying a sublease to a competitor are as follows: (1) the
incumbent will face a steeper declining demand curve for
air service 0 8 ; (2) incumbents will have greater control
over price'°9; (3) the incumbent firm will maximize profit
at a price higher than marginal cost (except when margi-
nal cost equals marginal revenue)'t1; (4) the incumbent
firm will earn an extra "oligopoly" profit above that which
it would earn in the face of free entry and a less steeply
declining demand curve to the incumbent'; and (5) air
service is misallocated since society does not get "as much
of [it from the incumbent] as it really wants in terms of
what [the air service] really costs society [to] produce."' 12
other fixed-based operators making the same or similar uses of such
airport utilizing the same or similar facilities, and (C) each air carrier
using such airport shall have the right to service itself or to use any
fixed-base operator that is authorized by the airport or permitted by
the airport to serve any air carrier at such airport: (2) there will be
no exclusive right for the use of the airport by any person providing,
or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the public.
Id. at § 2210(a)(1).
,ot See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 60, at 471.
1- See id.
1lo See id. at 474.
For the firm with some monopoly power, maximizing profits by
equating Marginal Revenue to Marginal Cost leads to a price that is
above Marginal Cost. The canny seller contrives an-artificial scarcity
of his product so as not to spoil the price he can get on the earlier
premarginal units.
For a small perfect-competitor, Marginal Revenue works out to be
exactly the same thing as Price. With no need to cut your P to sell an
extra unit of q, the incremental Marginal Revenue it brings you is
precisely the P received for that last unit, with no loss on previous
units being subtracted. Hence, MR = MC and P =MR do lead to
the special rule for profit maximizing by a perfect-competitor:
P = MR = MC at a perfect-competitor's Maximum-profit point
Id.
See id.
112 Id. at 476. This economist's definition of inefficiency resulting from a price
which exceeds marginal cost is sometimes difficult to translate in terms meaning-
ful to the lawyer or social scientist. The latter is apt to miss the whole point of the
economist's definition of optimum social pricing, by responding: "We shouldn't
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The "oligopoly profit" earned must then be added to the
value of the gate held by an incumbent firm who has the
power to deny the use of the gate to a potential competi-
tor. When added, it comes as no surprise that subleases
have fetched fees considered "excessive. ' 11 3
The "oligopoly profit" potential of a gate or airport fa-
cility must be taken into account in any proposal which
simply would allow gates to be sold or leased on the open
market, since a sale or sublease of a gate is, in part, a sale
of an oligopoly right. Merely allowing an oligopoly right
to be sold will not, standing alone, necessarily improve
resource allocation or efficiency. For example, at the
height of motor carrier regulation, the total value of mo-
tor carrier "operating certificates" (i.e., oligopoly rights)
was estimated to be worth three to four billion dollars."i 4
Indeed, the American Trucking Association noted that
"virtually the only way for [a relatively small carrier] to
care so much about economic efficiency, instead we should be concerned about
fairness and the social welfare." Thus, under airline regulation, the regulators
had no qualms about enforcing a price higher than marginal cost on some high-
density routes, while insisting upon a price lower than marginal pricing on some
low-density routes. This required some passengers to cross-subsidize others.
Although the regulator rationalizes such a policy on the ground of the "public
welfare," the net result is a tragic waste of society's resources. The following ex-
ample may be helpful: Suppose that a regulator decides that, in the interests of
"public welfare," all television sets must be priced at $10, even though it costs
$200 to produce them. (The manufacturer is provided with a $190 subsidy to
make up the difference in cost). At a $10 price, a consumer may purchase a televi-
sion just to get the glass for a picture frame since such glass alone costs $15. The
rest of the television, now useless, may be discarded. Other consumers, however,
to whom the television would provide more than $200 worth of utility, cannot get
a television at any price, since there are not enough sets available for all consum-
ers who demand them at the $10 price. The consumer to whom the television set
provides only $10 worth of utility ends up wasting $190 worth of society's labor.
The consumer to whom the television set would provide $250 worth of utility gets
nothing or may end up buying it on the black market for $500 when it only cost
society $200 to produce it. The result is waste, pure and simple, since "society
does not get as much of it in terms of what it cost society [to] produce." Id. If the
"public welfare" demands that all consumers be able to purchase a television set,
the solution is to redistribute the dollar "votes" - not create an economic envi-
ronment where price is either above or below marginal cost.
Iis AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
11 See Snow & Sobotka, Certification Values, in REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRIC-
ING IN TRUCK TRANSPORTATION 153 (P. MacAvoy &J. Snow ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as FORD PAPERS].
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obtain additional operating authorities is to buy them
from other motor carriers." ' 15 Merely allowing an oligop-
oly right to be sold has two effects: (1) it shifts oligopoly
profits from the seller firm to the buyer firm; and (2) it
reduces the oligopoly profits of the buyer firm by the
amount paid for the oligopoly right. The sale of a certifi-
cate in no way alters the nature of the oligopoly right it-
self, which still enables its holder (whoever that may be)
to maximize profit at a price in excess of marginal cost.
In economic terms, possession of a scarce airport gate
or facility differs little from possession of an "operating
certificate" under economic regulation, for without it a
firm simply can not "operate." It is not surprising, there-
fore, that those in possession of gates or terminal space
are reluctant to give up those possessions at any price. In-
deed, the Airport Operators Council International
(AOCI) conducted a survey revealing that sixty of the
eighty-eight United States airports responding did not
have any unleased terminal space for new entries' 16;
thirty-one airports indicated infeasible subleasing situa-
tions due to high utilization of leased space, or because of
"excessive" rates to sublessees." 7  This experience in
long-term gate leases raises some concern about the prog-
nosis for slot sales or leases under Buy-Sell. Further-
more, the FAA Slot Sale Rule does not address the
problems of access denial to terminal facilities. The use-
fulness of Buy-Sell as a means of eliminating obstacles to
free entry must therefore be evaluated in that context.
115 Id. For a tragic example of the injustices caused by the certificate system, see
Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957). In that case, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission had denied a certificate to a carrier offering faster
and cheaper service, since slower and more expensive service was deemed "ade-
quate." Id. at 89. Although the Court reversed the ICC decision six years after
the agency denied the certificate, Schaffer had gone out of business by that time.
See A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 40, at 114.
116 AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 71.
11 Id. Twenty-nine airports indicated that subleasing arrangements were still
possible. Id.
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B. Landing Slots
Much of the foregoing analysis of gate and terminal
space values also applies to landing slots. One very im-
portant difference must be recognized, however, before
determining the economic value of landing slots -
namely, the difference in legal status.' 1 8 As noted, termi-
nal space may be either leased or owned outright by an air
carrier.119 Except for possible antitrust considerations,12 0
such leases or sales of space are recognized legally as
transfers of legitimate property rights.12 ' The court in the
Branif case, discussed above, 122 described slots as "not
property in themselves.' 2 3 In the case of slots not recog-
nized as property, valuable economic rights given in ear-
lier years may be retrieved more easily for purposes of
allocation de novo.
A landing slot is best characterized as the right to take
off or land aircraft at an airport - in short, a "reserva-
tion" for takeoffs and landings. 124 Nevertheless, an im-
portant common denominator exists with respect to both
gates and slots: both carry with them the economic
equivalent of an operating certificate. Thus, in determin-
ing the value of a slot, the value to a holder of denying
entry to a competitor must be considered.
A 1983 FTC Economic Policy Analysis calculated the
base value of a slot (i.e., an airline's willingness to pay for
a slot) by a traditional demand and cost approach. 125 The
118 See Branif, 700 F.2d at 942.
119 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 385-394 and accompanying text.
121 See AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 70.
122 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
12 700 F.2d at 942.
124 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. F.A.A., 772 F.2d 1508, 1510 (1 1th Cir. 1985). The
FTC has noted that the more precise definition of a slot is the "right to use the
navigable airspace for a takeoff or landing at a particular airport during a particu-
lar hour of the day." Comments of the Bureaus of Economics, Competition, and
Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission before the FAA 2, n.1,
Docket No. 24,110 (Aug. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Bureau Comments].
125 FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 39-69.
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report, upon which the FAA heavily relied, defines a slot's
value as follows:
The maximum price an airline would pay for a slot is the
amount that, when added to the other costs of the flight
that will use the slot, equals the flight's expected revenues.
This amount is directly related to the value that passen-
gers place on the flight which, in turn, is a function of such
variables as passengers' income, purpose of trip, [etc.]
126
The FTC report opines that if slots could be freely sold,
"carriers with high-valued flights would bid slots away
from those with low-valued flights."'' 27 The report further
notes that, to the extent that non-market allocation meth-
ods prevent free entry, "monopoly profits can be earned
in otherwise contestable markets."'' 28 That non-market
allocation methods in fact create such barriers finds sup-
port in a reference to the action of an airline scheduling
committee at Washington National:
At the last meeting the dispute was so intense that nine
airlines voted against a proposal that would have given
each of them exactly the number of flights they wanted.
They did so, they said, to keep New York Air and USAir
from increasing the number of their flights.' 2 9
But while recognizing the threat of free entry caused by
non-market methods, the report minimizes a similar
threat posed by a market approach:
The likelihood of successful monopolization by buying
slots ... appears to be small. While a slot market would
facilitate the obtaining of slots by the airline attempting to
monopolize, it would be necessary for the airline to obtain
most of the slots available at an airport to monopolize any
route into that airport. And, the existence of the slot mar-
ket would also facilitate entry by rivals, if the would-be
126 Id. at 7.
'7 Id. at 8.
128 Id. at 20.
129 Id. at 16 (quoting The Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1982).
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monopolizer attempted to raise his price.130
There are two problems with this analysis. First, the al-
ternatives are not total monopolization or total contest-
ability. A declining demand curve can be steeper by
degrees. While total monopolization might not be feasi-
ble for the reasons given by the report, the fact remains
that each slot held by an incumbent firm represents ex-
actly one slot not held by a competitor. Each competitor
eliminated from the market causes the demand curve fac-
ing the incumbent to become slightly steeper, thereby
permitting the incumbent to reap, by degrees, a slightly
higher oligopoly profit. Second, the incentive of an in-
cumbent to prevent free entry by manipulating political or
non-market procedures or mechanisms (such as a sched-
uling committee), should be no greater than the incentive
to do so by using market power to outbid potential
entrants.
The report confidently states that "an airline would not
buy a slot in order to operate a flight that is expected to
have a relatively low value, simply because it has the cash
to do so,1' 13 ' noting that "[c]apital markets exist precisely
to evaluate such investments and to provide funds for
those that appear sufficiently attractive."'13 2 The latter
conclusion apparently follows from a slot value calcula-
tion that fails to account for the oligopoly profits accruing
to the large firm able to frustrate free entry of a competi-
tor by outbidding it for a slot.
A slot has a premium oligopoly value for a firm facing a
non-horizontal demand curve. Such a firm has a large
enough percentage of the market to influence price by va-
rying output. However, this extra oligopoly premium




13, Id. at 28.
132 Id.
133 A firm not large enough to affect price by varying output has no incentive to
outbid solely for the purpose of depriving a competitor of a slot. To outbid a
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The value of a slot to a new entrant or expanding com-
petitor facing a horizontal demand curve nevertheless
may be greater than the base value which reflects only the
amount which "when added to the other costs of the flight
that will use the slot, equals the fight's expected reve-
nues."' 134 This excess represents the value of the right to
do business at all. Thus, for the hopeful entrant, a slot
represents more than just a cost of operating a particular
flight. The slot serves effectively as an "operating
certificate.' 135
The above proposition is exemplified by a potential
new entrant willing to pay a price for a slot in excess of
that amount which "when added to the other costs of the
flight that will use the slot, equals the flight's expected
revenues."'' 36 The entrant will pay the higher price be-
cause it knows that the market price of a flight will not
cover slot costs; the entrant will take even a loss initially,
in order to gain a foothold in the market. As Areeda and
Turner noted in their landmark article Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section Two of the Sherman Act:
[P]romotional price is a temporary, low price designed to
induce patronage with the expectation that the customer
will continue purchasing the product in the future at a
higher price .... [P]romotional price may be below cost
[and such] pricing can facilitate new entry or the expan-
sion of small rivals in an industry dominated by one or a
few large firms. 137
The authors qualify this observation, however, by noting
that "the monopolist can make no such case for promo-
tional pricing. . . . In contrast to new entrants or small
rivals, he has little need to resort to extreme price reduc-
competitor for this purpose alone could not serve to steepen the small firm's own
demand curve, since its demand curve is, by definition, horizontal. Thus, no oli-
gopoly profit could be earned solely by depriving a competitor of a slot.
154 FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 7.
1 - See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
-1 FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 7.
1' Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section Two of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 713 (1975).
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tions to acquaint existing consumers with the merits of his
brand." 138
For the small entrant facing a horizontal demand curve,
a slot's value includes the right to operate and gain the
opportunity to engage in promotional pricing below aver-
age cost, an operation that carries with it the potential for
reaping future profits at prices above average cost.
The preceding analysis leads to the following proposi-
tion: For large firms facing non-horizontal demand
curves, the oligopoly premium of a slot (and thus the total
value of the slot) will vary with the extent of that firm's
market share. For smaller firms facing horizontal demand
curves, the "right to operate" or "opportunity for promo-
tion" premium of a slot (and thus the total value of the
slot) will vary with that firm's potential for future profits at
prices above average cost. Thus, to the extent that the large
firm's total premiums exceed the smaller firm's total premiums, the
large firm will have the economic incentive to outbid the smaller
firm for a slot. However, as the FTC correctly observed, this
does not necessarily mean they will have the economic
power to do so. The fact that the major carrier has more
money in the bank than the smaller carrier is not determi-
native. Slot sales can be financed, and generally lenders
look to past performance in lending money.1 39 (Indeed,
the rate of return for the twelve largest firms in 1981-82
was less than for the next smaller group of carriers.1 40 )
Thus, the smaller carriers might have greater economic power than
the larger firms to finance, and, consequently, greater power to
purchase slots. This would be particularly true if the large
firms lack liquidity or if they have large debt to capital
ratios.
Nevertheless, because of the greater value of a slot to
large firms, these firms may end up outbidding smaller
firms. If this occurs, the following will result: (1) Entry
will be inhibited, thus permitting incumbent firms to face
-8 Id. at 714.
1"9 FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28.
140 Id.
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a steeply declining demand curve and enabling them to
set prices at a profitable, but misallocative, level above
marginal cost. (2) Combined with a "lose it or use it" pro-
vision, large outbidding firms may use slots for flights that
do not cover variable costs in order to keep the slots and
thus preserve an oligopoly profit on other flights. To the
extent that such a slot might be utilized for a more highly
valued flight by an outbid competitor, society sustains a
net economic loss.
The foregoing discussion should not be read to suggest
that existing non-market allocative methods are superior
to Buy-Sell. Rather, the quest simply seeks discovery of a
"least anti-competitive" solution. An informed choice of
allocative method(s) can be made only after comparison
of the economic effects of all methods. The choice of allo-
cative method(s) depends first, however, upon an under-
standing of the value of the resource to be allocated.
V. LEGAL STATUS OF AIRPORT RESOURCES
Some proposed methods of airport resource allocation
will require changes in federal statutory law, regulatory
policy, or state or local law; others will not. Thus, any
proposed allocation method must take into account the
legal status of airport resources as private property.
The first major legislation affecting airlines was the
Contract Mail Act of 1925.11 Rate-setting powers for air-
mail contracts were given to the Interstate Commerce
Commission under an amendment to the Airmail Act of
1934.142 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave broad
economic regulatory powers to the newly created CAB. 43
The Federal Aviation Act gave the FAA responsibility for
14, 43 Stat. 805 (1925) (current version at 39 U.S.C. §§ 5401-03 (1982)). See
Morgan, Government and the Industry's Early Development, in HARVARD PROJECT, supra
note 54, at 14.
142 48 Stat. 933-39 (current version at 39 U.S.C. §§ 5401-03 (1982)). See Note,
Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74
YALE L.J. 1416, 1418 (1965).
143 See 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542
(1982)).
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aviation safety,144 establishing air-navigation facilities145
and authority to assign navigable airspace. 46 The FAA
frequently has maintained its ultimate power to allocate
slots under such statutory grants of authority, in one or-
der asserting that it would impose minute by minute re-
strictions on slots if carriers could not agree on a
voluntary allocation. 147 In general, federal courts have ac-
knowledged FAA's power to assign slots' 48 subject to lim-
ited review in the appellate courts.' 49 The FAA exerts
additional influence on airport policies and operations
through its ownership of air traffic control equipment.'5 °
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 brought an end
to formal economic regulation of the airline industry.' 5 '
Pursuant to this act, the CAB ceased to exist onJanuary 1,
1985,152 and its surviving responsibilities were transferred
to the DOT and FAA. 15 3 Economic deregulation since
1978 has brought into sharp focus the existing restrictions
on airport access. Before deregulation, airport access re-
strictions did not result in entry control since CAB regula-
tion already controlled entry. 5 4  Under deregulation,
144 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (West Supp. 1986).
145 See id. at § 1348(b).
146 See id. at § 1348(c).
147 FAA notice 84-14, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,082 (1984). See 14 C.F.R. pt. 93 (1985).
In further exercise of such authority, the FAA promulgated various "High Den-
sity" rules establishing quotas on the number of Instrument Flight Rule reserva-
tions per hour. See 38 Fed. Reg. 29,463 (1973). These rules culminated in the
"Interim Operations Plan," see 49 Fed. Reg. 8,327 (1984), in the aftermath of the
1981 PATCO strike. This plan extended slot restrictions to twenty-two airports.
See id.
148 The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act reveals "unquestionable
authority for all aspects of airspace management in the [FAA]." S. REP. No. 1811,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1958), quoted in Branif, 700 F.2d at 941.
149 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1486(a) (West Supp. 1986).
1- See id. at § 1348(b).
151 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
1.2 See supra note 5.
1" See supra note 151.
'- See generally S. BREYER, supra note 61; HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 54;
Dempsey, supra note 52, at 329;Jones, Government Price Controls and Inflation: A Prog-
nosis Based on the Impact of Controls in the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L. REV.
303, 317-18 (1980).
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airport access restrictions primarily control entry. Such
airport restrictions therefore have taken on an economic
significance that did not exist during industry regulation.
However, the legal authority relating to these restrictions
has not fully accommodated this change in economic
status.
A. Federal vs. Local Authority
The question of who has the authority to restrict airport
access complicates the problem of determining the legal
status of airport resources. While FAA has authority over
safety and assignment of navigable spaces, 15 5 the line
sometimes blurs between that power and state 15 6 and lo-
cal propriety authority to control noise, 57 condemn prop-
erty adjacent to airports, 58 and enter into local leasing
agreements. 59
49 U.S.C.A. § 1348(a) (West Supp. 1986).
See Depue, Airport Use andAccess, 4 NORTHROP U.L.J. 159, 162 (1983).
137 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Aviation Safety and
Noise Abatement Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2101-08 (1982).
S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6-7 (1968) provides that:
It is not the intent of the committee in recommending this legisla-
tion to effect any change in the existing apportionment of powers
between the Federal and State and local governments .... The Fed-
eral Government is in no position to require an airport to accept
service by larger aircraft and, for that purpose, to obtain longer run-
ways. Likewise, the Federal Government is in no position to require
an airport to accept service by noisier aircraft, and for that purpose
to obtain additional noise easements. The issue is the service de-
sired by the airport owner and the steps it is willing to take to obtain
the service. In dealing with this issue, the Federal Government
should not substitute its judgment for that of the States or elements
of the local government who, for the most part, own and operate our
Nation's airports." The proposed legislation is not designed to do
this and will not prevent airport proprietors from excluding any air-
craft on the basis of noise considerations.
Id, reprinted in Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation: A Case Law Analysis, 47 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 449, 453 n.18 (1982) (quoting Letter from Secretary of Transportation to
Committee on Commerce (June 22, 1968)).
158 See, e.g., Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n of Minneapolis and St.
Paul, 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974).
1.5 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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In Griggs v. Allegheny County1 6 0  the United States
Supreme Court held local airport authorities, rather than
the FAA, responsible for noise damage done to property
adjacent to a local airport, even though FAA played a
large role in construction of the airport. 16 ' At least one
commentator interprets subsequent congressional acts 62
as assigning primary responsibility for noise control to lo-
cal authorities while still acknowledging some federal in-
terest. 63  (For example, the FAA has responsibility for
setting aircraft noise emission levels.' 64)
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. , 165 how-
ever, the Court struck down a local noise regulation on
the ground that it was preempted by federal legislation
giving the FAA control over noise.1 66 Federal courts have
369 U.S. 84 (1962).
16, Id. at 89.
162 See, e.g., the compilation of acts set forth in Bennett, supra note 157, at 452-
53. These include, inter alia, the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of
1979, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2101-08 (1982), and the Airport Noise Compatability
Planning Regulation of 1984, 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1985).
163 One commentator summarizes the law in this area as follows:
A review of the federal and state cases demonstrates that the judici-
ary still adheres to the Griggs decision. This adherence to Griggs
strongly emphasizes that responsibility for the consequences of
noisy aircraft is with the airport proprietor, regardless of whether
the proprietor is a public entity or a private party. The airport pro-
prietor has the authority to control noise levels through the determi-
nation of the airport's location, the direction of the runways and
therefore the direction of flight of the aircraft, and through the con-
struction and the operation of the airport. It is evident that federal
plenary powers in the area of navigable airspace do not shield the
airport proprietor against legal, and thus financial, responsibilty for
damages due to aircraft noise.
Bennett, supra note 157, at 463.
6 See generally National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
70 (1982).
365 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
Id. at 633-34. The Court states:
[The Noise Control Act] reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that
FAA, now in conjunction with EPA, has full control over aircraft
noise, preempting state and local control ....
It is the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of
aircraft noise that leads us to conclude that there is pre-emption. As
Mr. Justice Jackson stated, concurring in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303: "Federal Control is intensive and ex-
clusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds.
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attempted to reconcile Griggs and Burbank by making a dis-
tinction between "inflight" and "ground" restrictions. 6 7
They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection,
in the hands of federally certified personnel. The moment a ship
taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed sys-
tem of controls." Id. at 633-34.
It also may be significant to note that Griggs was decided before the Noise Control
Act, and Burbank was decided after passage of that act.
167 See, e.g., Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1975); Air
Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); County of Cook
v. Priester, 318 N.E.2d 327, 22 Ill. App. 3d 964 (1974). The Court in Burbank
relied heavily on a letter from the Secretary of Transportation dated June 22,
1968, written in response to a question as to whether the Noise Control Act would
"to any degree preempt State and local government regulation of aircraft noise
and sonic boom." (asked during Hearings Before the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce on S. 707 and H.R. 3400, Aircraft Noise Abatement Regulation, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1968)). Burbank, 411 U.S. at 624. The letter stated in part:
The courts have held that the Federal Government presently
preempts the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves control-
ling the flight of aircraft .... H. R. 3400 would merely expand the
Federal Government's role in a field already preempted. It would
not change this preemption. State and local governments will re-
main unable to use their police powers to control aircraft noise by
regulating the flight of aircraft.
Id. (quoting the letter). The dissent in Burbank responded with a quote from a
Senate Commerce Committee report on the 1968 amendments to the Federal
Aviation Act:
However, the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State
or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing
regulations or establishing requirements as to the permissible level
of noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport
owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their air-
ports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such
exclusion is nondiscriminatory.
Id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent concludes,
Considering the language Congress enacted into law, the available
legislative history, and the light shed by these on the congressional
purpose, Congress did not intend either by the 1958 Act or the 1968
Amendment to oust local governments from the enactment of regu-
lations such as that of the city of Burbank. The 1972 Act quite clearly
intended to maintain the status quo between federal and local au-
thorities. The legislative history of the 1972 Act, quite apart from its
concern with avoiding additional preemption, discloses a primary fo-
cus on the alteration of procedures within the Federal Government
for dealing with problems of aircraft noise already entrusted by Con-
gress to federal competence. The 1972 Act set up procedures by
which the Administrator of EPA would have a role to play in the
formulation and review of standards promulgated by FAA dealing
with noise emissions ofjet aircraft. But because these agencies have
exclusive authority to reduce noise by promulgating regulations and
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One commentator's survey of the cases on noise restric-
tion gleans three criteria for local power over n6ise abate-
ment: (1) no undue impact on interstate commerce 68 ; (2)
the local authority meets the federal definition of an "air-
port proprietor" 169; and (3) the restrictions are reason-
able and non-discriminatory.
170
Nevertheless, the line between federal and local author-
ity over noise restriction remains blurred. 7 ' A 1983 Air-
port Access Task Force Report observed that "the fear of
liability attributable to noise... has caused Federal agen-
cies to shrink from fully asserting their preemptive au-
thority over aviation noise, and has also caused some
airport proprietors to adopt use restrictions."'172 The re-
port concluded that "[w]hile noise limitations may pro-
vide some protection to local residents, they have affected
airport access because of operating and use restrictions
that have been imposed. Proliferation of such restrictions
would significantly degrade the national air transportation
system and frustrate competition." '17
The report suggests that federal action be taken to in-
sure a quieter environment, thus obviating the need for
implementing standards directed at one or several of the causes of
the level of noise, local governmental bodies are not thereby fore-
closed from dealing with the noise problem by every other conceiva-
ble method.
Id.
168 See DePue, Airport Use and Access, 4 NORTHROP U.L.J. 159, 162 (1983).
169 See id. and the cases cited therein.
170 See id.
'7, The tension between federal and local authorities on the issue of noise con-
trol remains high. See Rocky Mountain News, Mar. 6, 1986, at 7, col. 1, in which a
heated public hearing discussed an "FAA proposal [which] could eliminate noise
restrictions requested by Adams County and void the Denver-Adams County
[noise] agreement." Governor Lamm is quoted as complaining, "Is Colorado to
have no control over its own destiny?" Id.
172 AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 28.
17- Id. at 45. The report made the point even more strongly:
Current restrictions prevent deployment of some aircraft at various
airports during certain hours, by requiring inefficient flight proce-
dures, by constraining development of markets, by impeding the de-
velopment of connecting schedules, and by increasing ihe costs of
operators' maintenance and training activities.
Id. at 23.
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local restrictions. 174 In fact, any effective airport resource
allocation method will require a high degree of federal ac-
tion preempting all but the most minimal local restric-
tions on access under the banner of noise control.
An effective allocation method requires uniform access
standards. Since aircraft always travel between two
points, one airport's access restriction inevitably affects
other airports. Traditional applications of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution and federal noise
statutes have failed to establish the necessary uniform-
ity.1 75 Efficiency in transportation depends upon competi-
tion, which in turn depends upon airport access standards
that are fair, non-discriminatory, and free. Diverse, local
access restrictions, even for such an important social pur-
pose as noise abatement, retard rather than advance the
quest for an optimum allocation method. 176
174 Id. at 30:
The Task Force urges that the U.S. Congress consider legislation
which would involve the Federal Government in the review of local
noise restrictions; such legislation would impose liability on the Fed-
eral Government to the extent FAA mandates any change to local
rules. FAA would then be able to review proposed limitations on
airports to: a) assure noise reduction to the maximum extent practi-
cal; b) examine proposed local use restrictions; c) determine
whether meaningful noise abatement will result; and d) determine
when airport use restrictions impose an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
175 See, e.g., Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp.
927, 938-45 (C.D. Cal. 1979); National Aviation v. City of Hayard, 418 F. Supp.
417, 425-28 (N.D. Cal. 1976); British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New
York and NewJersey, 431 F. Supp. 1216, 1220-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d
75 (2d Cir. 1977). As the AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 40, says,
Airport proprietors generally have been cautious about adopting
some types of use restrictions, knowing that they have a duty to
avoid burdening interstate commerce. The tendency has been to
minimize use restrictions that actually reduce economic activity,
while comparatively liberal application has been made of restrictions
that prevent further growth. The result is that few single use restric-
tions at a single airport can be shown to significantly burden inter-
state commerce; the question is removed to the nature of "if such-
and-such use restriction is applied throughout the nation, would in-
terstate commerce be significantly burdened?" The answer to this
question applied to many of the restrictions in place today, is easily
answered, "Yes I"
176 It should be noted that the Buy-Sell Rule clearly places regulatory authority
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B. Terminal Facilities
The present legality of long-term leases and sales of
terminal space to private firms endures as the most frus-
trating legal barrier to an optimum allocative method.
Fair and free entry will never be possible as long as major
trunk incumbents control primary airport access through
such lease interests or ownership. Unfortunately, while
entry into such long-term leases in today's deregulated
environment might draw antitrust scrutiny,17 7 these leases
did not draw antitrust attention during economic regula-
tion since they were not the primary instrument of entry
control.'7 8 Indeed, the financial commitments made by
private carriers entering long-term leases were considered
essential for bond financing.' 79 Unlike slots, these leases
enjoy the protection of traditional contract and property
law principles.18 0 As the Airport Access Report so aptly
understated, "long term exclusive agreements may create
potential competitive problems in today's deregulated en-
vironment to the extent that they may enable incumbent
carriers at the airport to control access to essential airport
facilities.''
In view of the legal restraints on altering existing long-
term terminal commitments to private carriers, the report
could suggest only solutions like "buying out" the incum-
bents in order to reallocate leased spaces.'8 2 This solu-
tion hardly appears satisfactory, however, since the
economic incentives for outbidding a competitor for
space also will encourage refusal to sell space to an air-
over slot sales with FAA, and does not permit local airports to sell slots on their
own.
177 See infra notes 384-394.
178 Entry used to be controlled administratively under the powers granted to
CAB by the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 873 (1938) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1982)).
179 AIRPORT AcCESs REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
0SO See supra notes 99-101.
is, AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
182 Id. at 93. Other options listed by the report were: (1) require incumbents to
sublease; (2) automatically recapture space; and (3) permit the market to force
sublease. Id. at 81-82.
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port authority who will in turn lease the space to a possi-
ble competitor.'8 3
C. Slots
"Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant





The economic value of slots has been established.' 85
Any allocative method, however, must take into account
the procedure and source of legal authority for creation
and distribution of slots. The Federal Aviation Act offers
the natural starting point. This act states, "The Secretary
of Transportation is authorized and directed to develop
plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of
the navigable airspace; and assign by rule ... the use of
the navigable airspace ... in order to insure the safety of
aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace.' 8 6
As set forth in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B.,187 it had
been assumed for a long time under regulation that the
"FAA/DOT bears the primary responsibility for safety
regulation while the CAB administers and enforces the
economic provisions of the [Federal Aviation] Act." '
Pursuant to its authority to regulate safety, the FAA in
1968 issued the first of a series of High-Density Traffic
Airport Rules8 " for specified high-density airports; these
rules later were expanded to include additional airports
after the 1981 PATCO strike. 90 Since these regulations
183 See supra notes 87-139 and accompanying text.
322 U.S. 292, 303 (1943).
185 See supra notes 118-138 and accompanying text.
,so 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a) (1982).
187 543 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'- Id. at 259.
,so 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968).
1- See 14 C.F.R. § 93.123 (1982).
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clearly sought to ensure that total traffic and slots per
hour' 9' did not exceed safe capacity, they prompted little
controversy as to their legality. Only when FAA/DOT at-
tempted to regulate slot allocation among particular air-
lines did serious challenges to the FAA/DOT occur. In
Northwest Airlines v. Goldschmidt,'92 for example, DOT
issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation 43
(SFAR/43),'95 which allocated specific slots to particular
carriers. DOT issued the order in response to the dead-
lock of the Airline Scheduling Committee which, despite a
grant of antitrust immunity, 94 had failed to reach agree-
ment on slot allocations. 195 This deadlock purportedly
had been precipitated by the demand of a new entrant,
New York Air, to obtain twenty slots at peak hours to ser-
vice flights between National Airport in Washington,
D.C., and New York City.1 96 Although the complaints
raised several grounds for seeking judicial review of
SFAR/43, 97 including lack of DOT jurisdiction,'9" and
the merits of the regulation,' 99 the critical question cen-
tered on the issue of statutory authority. The petitioners
argued that the DOT allocation of slots to particular air-
lines constituted an economic regulation by DOT 20 and
that DOT's authority was limited to safety regulation.20 1
The court conceded that SFAR/43 went beyond safety
regulation, but nevertheless found the action within the
bounds of the Federal Aviation Act because that act gave
DOT authority not only over safety, but also over "the
efficient utilization of such airspace. ' '20 2 The court further
19, See id.
192 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1982).
,9- See 14 C.F.R. pt. 93 (1982).
1- Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d at 1312; see also CAB orders set forth supra note 10.
,9- Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d at 1312.
19 Id.
197 Id. at 1313.
198 Id.
199 Id.
2-0 Id. at 1314.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1314-15 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1982), and H.R. REP. No. 2360,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3741,
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found that any "incidental economic impact ' 20 3 of the
regulation did not make it an "economic regulation. 20 4
In fact, the economic implications of Goldschmidt are
substantial. By upholding authority to decide which carri-
ers receive valuable slots, the court in effect sanctioned
DOT's power to raise or lower entry barriers in the airline
industry. Since a slot serves as an "operating certifi-
cate ' 20 5 no less than the certificates issued by the CAB
during formal economic regulation, government authority
to regulate the airline industry arguably has simply been
transferred to the FAA, and has not been abolished by the
Airline Deregulation Act. Two factors, however, lessen
the economic impact of Goldschmidt: (1) DOT orders such
as SFAR/43 and their progeny20 6 are more restricted in
scope than CAB orders under formal economic regulation
and generally apply only to a handful of high-density air-
ports20 7 ; and (2) in exercise of its powers, DOT has made
a substantial effort to accommodate the needs of new
entrants.208
DOT orders allocating slots to particular carriers have
indicated general reluctance to allocate administratively,
preferring allocation by scheduling agreement.20 9 In-
3741-42). The court further cited 49 U.S.C. § 1301(29) for a definition of"navi-
gable airspace": "airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by
regulations issued under this chapter, [including] airspace needed to insure safety
in take-off and landing of aircraft." Id. at 1315.
205 Id. at 1314: "[T]he fact that SFAR 43 may have an incidental economic im-
pact upon the air carriers operating at National [by limiting particular air carriers'
operations] does not transform SFAR 43 into an economic regulation."
- Id.: "[W]e agree with the Secretary that SFAR 43 is neither an economic
regulation or a safety regulation per se, but instead a regulation of the efficient
utilization of the navigable airspace of the United States."
205 See supra notes 114-115.
200 See supra notes 3, 6-10 for examples of such orders.
207 See 49 Fed. Reg. 8,237 (1984).
208 SFAR/43, for instance, allocated eighteen slots to New York Air. See Gold-
schmidt, 645 F.2d at 1313.
200 Former CAB Chairman Dan McKinnon stated in his concurring opinion in
Application for Discussion Authority and Prior Approval of Carrier Agreements to Integrate
Schedules, CAB Order No. 84-10-120 at 1 (Oct. 25, 1984):
The congestions created at the six airports addressed in this Order
have become so severe, it is worth a minimal government involve-
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deed, the FAA/DOT power to allocate administratively
has been used as a club to force agreements. In FAA no-
tice 84-14, for example, the FAA threatened "minute by
minute restrictions if carriers could not agree on a volun-
tary [allocation]. ' 210  At the same time, however, the CAB
(before its demise) granted antitrust immunity for such
scheduling agreements only with reluctance. As the CAB
stated in its controversial order 84-10-120:
"We recognize that the discussions could have a substan-
tial and adverse effect on competition. Yet on the basis of
DOT/FAA representations about the delay problems, we
found that a serious transportation need exists and that
there is no reasonably available less anti-competitive solu-
tion. We concluded that an FAA imposed alternative
would not be less anti-competitive because the discussions
would give carriers greater flexibility and would involve a
smaller regulatory intrusion into the competitive
process." 21 1
In sum, Goldschmidt represents a now common failure to
consider and apply economic principles in a legal deci-
sion. The court's conclusion that assignment of slots to
individual carriers had only an "incidental economic im-
pact ' 21 2 was made without benefit of economic analysis on
the effect of administrative slot allocation on entry con-
trol,213 individual firm demand curves,2 14 marginal and va-
ment through antitrust immunity to see if the industry can coopera-
tively solve the congestion problem.
The alternative could be a frustrated public that eventually could
demand a return to some form of re-regulation of another government agency
forcefully regulating airline actions without concern for the benefits of competi-
tion.
Neither of these alternatives are acceptable in a competitive mar-
ket-place. So our approval of the voluntary schedule shifts accom-
plished through grant of antitrust immunity is the best temporary
solution. It is imperative that the airlines cooperate effectively to
avoid any additional government involvement.
Id. (emphasis added).
210 Id. at 2 n.6.
211 Id. at 2.
212 Goldschmidt, 654 F.2d at 1314.
21- For an example of an analysis that did address this factor, see FTC REPORT
OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 17:
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riable cost pricing,2 5 the potential for oligopolization,
21 6
or economic efficiency.21 7
Subsequent decisions have followed the Goldschmidt ap-
proach. In City of Houston v. FAA 218 the court upheld an
FAA order restricting flights to National Airport. 21 9 The
FAA based the order not upon any criteria of economic
efficiency or priority, but upon an arbitrary "distance to
place-of-origin" standard. As noted above, 220 the Braniff
court held slots to be "not property," and held that "any
transfer of a state or federal regulatory license or certifi-
cate is subject to the continuing jurisdiction and approval
of the applicable agency."' 22' In a similar manner, a fed-
eral court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. FAA 222 voided the sale
of slots by Air Florida to Eastern, but approved the sale of
Absent government imposed restrictions, entry into airline city-pair
markets is easy relative to entry into many other industries. Because
there are no significant economies of scale in airline operations, car-
riers can enter a city-pair market at a very small size without incur-
ring higher costs than larger incumbents. In addition, airline costs
are not "sunk" in the sense that, on withdrawing from a city-pair
market, an airline no longer incurs any costs associated with that
market. Because sunk costs are absent, economists describe entry
into airline markets as free ... markets with these characteristics are
called contestable. Such markets exhibit most of the desirable per-
formance characteristics of competitive markets, regardless of mar-
ket concentration; e.g., price is equal to the cost of providing each
service.
Although unregulated airline markets would probably be reason-
ably contestable, FAA slot regulation has imposed entry barriers.
214 See id. at 21.
215 See Areeda and Turner, supra note 78, at 711; see generally Eads, supra note 75,
at 159.
216 See FTC REPORT OF THE AIRPORT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 16.
217 See id.
2 18 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982). Airlines have circumvented the rule by hav-
ing flights to National make a "pit stop" at Dulles. This exacerbates the economic
efficiency problems caused by the distance limitation on flights to National.
219 Id. at 1192.
220 See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
221 700 F.2d at 942 (citing LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(radio license); Barutha v. Prentice, 189 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
841 (1951) (motor carrier license); In re Rainbo Express, Inc., 179 F.2d 1, 5 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Richardson v. National Acceptance Co., 339 U.S. 981
(1950) (ICC license); In re Airlines Transp. Carriers, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 679, 683-
84 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (CAB letter of registration)).
222 772 F.2d 1508 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
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Air Florida as "a going concern" (which included slots) to
Midway Airlines.223 The court rejected arguments that its
decision was economic and beyond its statutory
powers.
2 2 4
Ironically, Eastern was decided on the eve of the Decem-
ber 1985 DOT order permitting slot sales at designated
airports. It became apparent after Eastern, and indeed had
been since Goldschmidt, that any allocation method based
on economic principles would have to be sanctioned by
the FAA/DOT. It is significant that while a host of opin-
ions by private interests were heard by the FAA during
hearings, the most forceful views included those of the
DOJ,225 the Bureau of Economics, Competition, and Con-
sumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission,226
and economists such as former CAB Chairman Marvin
223 Id. at 1511.
224 Id. The court drew a distinction between buying routes and buying an air-
line which included routes. Thus, Midway was permitted to use the Air Florida
routes upon satisfaction of two requirements:
(1) Midway must have acquired Air Florida pursuant to a court-ap-
proved plan of reorganization, or (2) have in place a court-approved
and binding agreement to purchase the company guaranteed by a
letter of credit for a substantial percentage of the purchase price
which must be exercisable within a reasonable period. Under either
condition, [this court] must be convinced that the acquisition or
purchase price is at least equal to Air Florida's going concern value.
Id. at 1510.
The court also made an argument similar to the one made in Goldschmidt:
Nevertheless, even if the objection were properly raised, it would
fail. Eastern argues that the successorship finding made by the FAA
administrator was in effect an "economic decision" that only the De-
partment of Transportation had the authority to make. A similar ar-
gument was rejected by the Eighth Circuit in Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Goldschmidt, supra, in which an FAA slot regulation, although
it had a tangential economic impact, was not "economic regulation
per se" but "instead a regulation of the efficient utilization of the nav-
igable airspace of the United States." This decision represents a
similar regulation of airspace-one that the FAA is clearly author-
ized to make.
Id. at 1512 (citations omitted).
225 See DOJ Comments, supra note 25, at 7. DOJ points out that the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 "require(s) DOT/FAA to rely to the maximum extent
possible on market mechanisms to create an efficient, procompetitive system for
allocating source slots." Id.
21 See Bureau Comments, supra note 124.
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Cohen. 227 These latter views were based on economic2 28
rather than legal principles, and all supported a policy of
allowing slot sales.
The survival of the Buy-Sell Rule now may depend
upon the defeat of legislative attempts to overturn it.2 29 If
the rule stands, it will be the first time that the economic
value of an airport slot (if not its status as "property") has
been recognized by a permanent order of an agency or
department of the United States government.
VI. METHODS OF AIRLINE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Once the economic value and legal status of an airport
resource is determined, a survey of existing and proposed
methods of airport resource allocation must be made with
a view toward weighing their respective advantages and
disadvantages. A valid comparison with Buy-Sell can then
be made. To some extent, all allocative methods dis-
cussed herein have been tried on at least an experimental
basis, and therefore each leaves some track record by
which it can be judged.
Entry to the domestic airline industry may be viewed as
a series of economic 23 0 and government-imposed 23 1 ob-
227 Allocation and Transfer of Aviation Operating Rights-Slots and Certificates: Testimony
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) (statement of M. Cohen, Former Chairman,
CAB) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Testimony].
228 See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text.
229 For example, The Denver Post, Dec. 17, 1985, at 13A, col. 7, reported that
Senator Nancy Kassenbaum, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee's
subcommittee on aviation, said she would "introduce legislation to side track"
Buy-Sell.
2-0 See Bailey & Panzer, The Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to
Deregulation, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 126 (1981). The economic barriers
to entry, are not, however, as high as once supposed. In fact, since as early as
1962, economists have accepted the assumption that "there are no significant
economies of scale in air transport." Id.
232 The primary government obstacles (safety requirements) are really forms of
economic obstacles. The regulatory obstacles to market entry, of course, largely
have been eliminated by deregulation. Nevertheless, regulatory barriers to air-
port access persist. Today, these obstacles take the form of high-density regula-
tions limiting total capacity, antitrust immunity to incumbent-dominated
scheduling committees, and local and proprietary restrictions.
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stacles. The first barrier to entry simply involves the need
to raise sufficient capital to purchase planes which meet
FAA safety requirements, finance corporate organization,
and hire necessary employees. This "natural" economic
barrier always exists in a capitalist society. The most ef-
fective and often most insurmountable barrier, however,
is acquisition of terminal space, including gates. In many
cases, a carrier is not even "eligible" for a slot unless it
already has a gate.232
Each of the allocative methods discussed below consti-
tutes an airport resource system of rationing. Each
method differs, however, in purpose, rationale, standards
employed, and effect on entry control and economic effi-
ciency. In a very real sense, each system acts as an indi-
rect means of economic regulation of the airline industry
itself.
A. Gate and Terminal Leases
At most major airports, post-deregulation demand for
terminal space and gates exceeds supply.233 At these air-
ports, therefore, free entry may be denied, not because of
unavailability of "slots," but because of unavailability of
gates and terminal space. Typically these gates and termi-
nal facilities are the subject of long-term leases required
by airport proprietors to support revenue-bond financing
of these facilities. 234  Baltimore/Washington airport, for
example, has control over only four of twenty-seven gates
232 Gate possession is a practical prerequisite to a slot award. Interview with
Robert Coates, Airport Manager, Denver Stapleton Airport (Mar. 1986).
2S3 Traffic at O'Hare, Denver Stapleton, Detroit Metro, Los Angeles Interna-
tional, Philadelphia International, San Francisco International, St. Louis Lambert,
and Washington National, for example, exceeded 160% of practical capacity in
1984. Technology Seen as a Limited Solution to Easing Congestion, Av. WEEK. & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 10, 1984, at 71.
2 Since deregulation, there has been a renewed interest on the part of some
airport owners and operators to regain control of their own facilities. T. James
Truby, Maryland's Aviation Administrator, recently stated, "We're interested in
agreements that give us as much flexibility as possible to utilize our space as effi-
ciently as possible. We have attempted to gain control of as much of the existing
terminal as possible." Shifrin, Deregulation Bringing Airports More Interest in Own
Destiny, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 12, 1984, at 174.
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at its main terminal. The remaining gates are locked into
long-term leases until the year 2003.235 A large number
of the leases give the airline lessee total control of counter
space and gates, whether used or not. In other instances,
incumbent airlines own orjointly own terminal space, fur-
ther restricting airport proprietors' authority to transfer
underutilized space from one carrier to another.23 6 New
entrants thus can obtain gates only in the rare case where
a gate is available for lease or where a competitor will sub-
lease the gate space, usually for an extravagant fee.23
7
Following deregulation, the established airlines have
emphasized the hub and spoke feeder concept at major
airports.2 38  Between 1978 and 1984, airline seats on
flights from large and medium hubs increased 36% to
38%.239 This "hubbing" practice involves peak aircraft
235 Id. at 175.
236 Id. at 174. Maryland Aviation Administrator T. James Truby comments that
airlines in the past have dictated what would happen at most airports
preventing them from making capital improvements without general
concurrence of signatory carriers to long-term agreement with the
airport....
Because the airlines have guaranteed to pay enough rental charges
over the length of an agreement to let the airport recover construc-
tion costs and break even, the airlines with a majority use of a facility
often have the power to turn down future airport construction.
Some airport managers are concerned that incumbent carriers might
decline to approve capital improvements that could provide space
for low-cost new entrants.
Id. at 175-76.
237 Id. at 175:
[Airport officials] who have control of at least some gates said that
the airports get more flights out of the gates they control than car-
rier-controlled gates. They also can offer the use of their gates at
more reasonable prices than the carriers typically are willing to sub-
lease them for. [According to T. James Truby, Maryland Aviation
Administration,] "There is a tendency for incumbent carriers to
want to gouge subleased tenants," a statement backed by other air-
port managers.
It could be possible for airline control over gates to prevent a car-
rier's entrance to an airport. "I don't feel airport operators can af-
ford to, in effect, find their space held hostage by airlines which may
not always be enthusiastic about accommodating a new entrant,"
Truby said.
2-1 See CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
2,9 M. BRENNER, J. LEET & E. SCHOTr, AIRLINE DEREGULATION 98 (1985).
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operations at specific times to control on-line passenger
connections; for this to work, maximum access to terminal
gates becomes essential.
Long-term leases present a variety of potentially anti-
competitive barriers to new entrants. 24 0 An incumbent
may sublet space to new entrants. In practice, however,
incumbents usually do so only on terms which reflect their
own long-term requirements, and normally only to sub-
lessees who engage in non-competitive operations.2 4'
"Majority in interest" clauses in many leases present an-
other potential barrier. These clauses give the tenant air-
lines the right to approve specific proposals.242 Initially,
these clauses were deemed desirable as a means of pro-
tecting carriers from increased fees and rents resulting
from unnecessary and extravagant airport expendi-
tures. 243 The potential exists, however, for incumbents
not only to block new entrants' access to existing facilities,
but also to veto the construction of additional terminal fa-
cilities that might accommodate new entrants.244
The DOJ has taken the position that available resources
should be auctioned to the highest bidder. This would
occur on a staggered basis as leases expire:2 45
"[M]arket allocation . . . ensures that carriers able to
meet travelers' needs at the lowest cost have access to an
amount of space commensurate with their cost advantages
and that space in particular locations is used by carriers
for [whom] those locations are of greatest value. A market
system can result in the efficient level of service to travel-
ers and the efficient allocation of service among
carriers." 246
Although the DOJ proposal remains controversial, con-
240 See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
241 Id.
242 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
243 Id.
244 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
243 Separate Views of the Department ofJustice as Applicable to Working Group B-Terminal
Space and Gates, in AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 125.
246 Id.
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siderable agreement exists that the present subleasing
system at best constitutes a haphazard means of allocating
terminal space.24 7 Because these leasing arrangements
generally are not subject to airport review, they often
culminate in high fee agreements which also may reserve
the right of the lessor to recover space on short notice. 48
The status of gate and terminal space access as a prerequi-
site to business for profit gives these spaces significant
economic value over and above the costs of construction.
Like railroad terminals, airports provide essential facili-
ties conducive to natural monopoly. Given this, airports
must allow open access to other competing airlines upon
just and reasonable terms, in fashion similar to that re-
quired for the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
in 1912.249 The federal government, while recognizing
proprietary rights of airport operators, 250 also has man-
dated open, non-discriminatory access to terminal
facilities.251
247 Id.
248 See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
249 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 388-412
(1912). The Terminal Railroad Association acquired several independent termi-
nal companies in St. Louis with the purpose of combining and operating them as a
unitary system. The Supreme Court found this arrangement illegal under the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court remanded the case to bring the association
into conformity with the statute by, among other things, "providing for the admis-
sion of any existing or future railroad to joint ownership and control of the com-
bined terminal properties, upon such just and reasonable terms as shall place such
applying company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and burdens
with the present proprietary companies." Id. at 411.
2-0 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(b) (1982). Section 1305(b)(1) provides that:
nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to limit
authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or any inter-
state agency or other political agency of two or more States as the
owner or operator of an airport served by any air carrier certified by
the Board to exercise its proprietary powers and rights.
Id. at § 1305(b)(1).
251 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982). The Federal
Aviation Act provides in part:
No Federal funds, other than those expended under this chapter,
shall be expended, other than for military purposes (whether or not
in cooperation with State or other local government agencies), for
the acquisition, establishment, construction, alteration, repair, main-
tenance, or operation of any landing area, or for the acquisition, es-
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Measuring the effect of long-term leases on entry
presents difficulty. Air Transport Association members
have reported that while they know of no instances where
access to terminal space has been denied, new entrants
may not have obtained the facilities desired at the time
they were desired. 252 Sixty-eight percent of top airports
in the United States do not have terminal space available
for new entrants. Of these, half indicated impracticability
of subleasing as a means of permitting access, either be-
cause of high incumbent utilization of existing space or
because of exhorbitant rates for subleases. 53 In sum,
tablishment, construction, maintenance, or operation of air
navigation facilities thereon, except upon written recommendation
and certification by the Secretary of Transportation that such land-
ing area or facility is reasonably necessary for use in air commerce or
in the interests of national defense. Any interested person may ap-
ply to the Secretary of Transportation, under regulations prescribed
by him, for such recommendation and certification with respect to
any landing area or air navigation facility proposed to be estab-
lished, constructed, altered, repaired, maintained, or operated by, or
in the interests of, such person. There shall be no exclusive right for
the use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon which Fed-
eral funds have been expended. For purposes of the preceding sen-
tence, the providing of services at an airport by a single fixed-based
operator shall not be construed as an exclusive right if it would be
unreasonably costly, burdensome, or impractical for more than one
fixed-based operator to provide such services, and if allowing more
than one fixed-based operator to provide such services would re-
quire the reduction of space leased pursuant to an existing agree-
ment between such single fixed-based operator and such airport.
Id. at 1349(a).
252 AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 70:
Airlines formed after deregulation, described as "new entrants", and
one carrier operating several years before 1978, reported substantial
problems ranging from denial of access, to high cost sublease agree-
ments with compulsory ground handling by sublessor's personnel.
There were cases where space was vacant but refused, and one situa-
tion where a ramp had been vacant for 10 years and the incumbent
demanded payment for the 10 years of back rent it had paid the air-
port before it would consider leasing the vacant ramp.
Some carriers reported that even after space was made available,
they were subject to prior schedule approval by the incumbent, re-
peated shifting of flights to different gates within the incumbent's
gate complex, failure to provide or approve adequate signs, and bag-
gage priorities which resulted in the new entrant being routinely
handled last.
253 The National Air Carriers Association (NACA) reported that during the
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there can be little doubt that the long-term leasing system
acts as a significant entry control, thereby defeating the
objectives and purpose of the Airline Deregulation Act.
B. Local Noise Controls
As noted, the economic effects of entry control remain
the same regardless of the means of entry control.254 The
question of whether federal or local authorities have pri-
mary control over noise remains clouded, although local
airports do appear to have primary financial liability for
noise related-claims. 255 The fact that local noise restric-
tions fulfill a legitimate and even vital function 256 in no
way diminishes the deleterious economic effect on airline
deregulation.
A recent Airport Access Task Force concluded that
noise and environmental constraints "have significantly
impaired airport capacity and access. 2 5 7 While aircraft
noise at the national level has been reduced in the last ten
years due to increased use of new technology aircraft,258
noise restrictions have placed increasingly greater re-
straint on airport access and capacity. 59 Statistics show
that additional noise-related restrictions were imposed on
nineteen of the thirty-five largest passenger-handling air-
1960's and up to the mid-1970's, their members had been denied access to facili-
ties on an equal basis. In many instances NACA members had been denied free-
dom of choice at airports and had been relegated to service as general aviation
rather than as air carriers. Id. at 70. See id. at 71:
On one occasion, a regional carrier is being ground handled by a
host carrier that had joint fares with other regional carriers that
compete with the handled carrier to the same cities. The joint fare
competing carriers receive preferred treatment by the host carrier
on ticketing, baggage, and computer information. The handled car-
rier cannot do anything about it since they are not his employees,
and incumbent carriers with vacant space refuse to sublease that
space ....
254 See supra notes 155-175 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
256 See Neirenberg, Incentives Versus Regulation: The Case for Airport Noise Charges, 2
GEO. MASON L. REV. 167, 170-86 (1978).
257 AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
258 Id. at 33.
259 Id. at 34.
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ports260 and that noise concerns significantly inhibited ex-
pansion of new facilities.2 6' The Task Force identified
sixteen different types of noise restrictions, 262 noting con-
siderable debate over the effectiveness of the restrictions,
many of which merely shift noise control from one airport
to another.2 63 The Task Force also found that while sin-
gle restrictions at particular airports generally do not sub-
stantially burden interstate commerce, 2 6 haphazard
application of local restrictions across the nation would
have that effect.2 65 The Task Force concluded, therefore,
that the "proliferation of such restrictions would signifi-
cantly degrade the national air transportation system and
frustrate competition. ' 26 6 The Task Force proposed a
more active, clearly defined federal role. 67
The DOT disagreed with the Task Force suggestion
that the FAA be given authority to preempt state and local
actions to deal with airport noise.2 68 DOT concluded that
a national standard might be more efficient for airlines,
but might subject individual communities to more or less
noise than they might tolerate otherwise.2 69 In addition,
DOT proposed a system of direct charges based on air-




262 Id. at 37-39.
262 Id. at 39.
26 Noise restrictions must not be unjustly discriminatory nor arbitrary, nor may
they interfere unreasonably with interstate commerce. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,417
(1978). The tendency by airport proprietors, therefore, has been to minimize re-
strictions which reduce economic activity, while liberally applying those which
prevent growth. AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 40.
2r5 AIRPORT AcCEss REPORT, supra note 4, at 40.
26 Id. at 45.
267 Id. The Task Force noted that in the past, fear of liability for noise-related
damages caused federal agencies to refrain from asserting preemptive authority
over aviation noise. Non-proprietary use restrictions at airports are federally pre-
empted. See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text. However, a clear judicial
definition of non-proprietary use restrictions has not emerged.
266 AIRPORT AcCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 54.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 55.
19861
52 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
The Separate Comments of The Department of Justice
provide a practical and workable solution to the airport
noise problem. 7 1 Presently, airlines may ignore the true
''social costs" of their operational decisions because they
are not required to bear them.272 Under the DOJ propo-
sal, the cost of noise would be identified and passed on to
airport users, as an alternative to imposition of federal
noise restrictions. 273 The imposition of fees on noise pro-
ducers provides appropriate economic incentives and
places the cost of noise on those who produce it. 2 74 Air
carriers who control noise through quieter aircraft or
quiet operational procedures during a less noise-sensitive
time of day would be rewarded by lower costs. 275 Such a
system recognizes noise as an economic cost much like
fuel. Thus, aircraft noise which reduces the value of sur-
rounding property involves a partial condemnation of
property requiring compensation .276
271 Id. at 62-65.
272 Id. at 62.
275 Id. at 63-64.
274 See supra notes 156-174 and accompanying text.
275 See Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 184.
276 Generally, landowners urging inverse condemnation must show a sufficient
loss of the use and enjoyment of their property to constitute a taking. United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). In Causby, the Supreme Court
concluded,
As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but
do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as
a more conventional entry upon it.... While the owner does not in
any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of
it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same
sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and
air is used .... We think the landowner, as an incidence to his own-
ership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same cate-
gory as invasions of the surface.
Id. See Greater Westchester Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d
86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980). In Greater Westchester, the court held that federal preemption, per se, did
not preclude private state remedies for noise damages. Id., 603 P.2d at 1335.
The court noted that authorities had recognized that property owners have an
inverse condemnation remedy for airport-noise-related property damages or loss.
Id. The court then declared, "We discern no reason either in law or policy why
the common law and statutory remedy of nuisance ... should not under similar
circumstances equally protect the person of the owner or the occupant." Id. For
a review of noise litigation cases, see Bennett, supra note 157, at 474-83.
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Statistical studies have determined, with relative preci-
sion, the effect of aircraft noise on the value of prop-
erty. 2 " The most widely used measure for cumulative
airport noise exposure is the Noise Exposure Forecast
(NEF), a twenty-four-hour equivalent sound level that ac-
counts for the human ear's extrasensitivity to nighttime
noise. 278  An increase in noise exposure by one NEF
reduces the value of property near airports by approxi-
mately one percent.2 79 For example, property valued at
$50,000 with a noise exposure of 30 NEF would decrease
in value by $2,500 if the noise exposure increases to 35
NEF. To calculate the total cost of noise damage, the
"noise depreciation" percentage must be multiplied by
the number of residences affected.280 Noise charges could
be figured by dividing the total number of flight opera-
tions into the total damage figure, but the significant an-
noyance factor of nighttime noise should be reflected in
the NEF noise measure.2 8
The easiest method for implementing a noise charge
would be assessment of an aircraft type fee using average
noise levels.28 2 Measuring noise levels for all takeoffs and
landings, however, would result in quieter operational
procedures as well as incentives for retrofitting noise en-
gines283 and replacing noisier planes.2 4 The technical ca-
pacity for monitoring airport noise, in order to impose
277 See Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 186 n.101.
278 Nelson, A Survey of Recent Evidence, 14J. TRANSp. ECON. & POL. 37, 40 (1980).
279 Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 186-187.
280 Id. at 187.
281 Id. Nierenberg suggests that the practical approach is to measure noise in
Effective Perceived Noise Decibels (EPNdB) as applied to individual takeoffs and
landings. This takes into account the effect of louder noise on more people. See
id.
i282 Id. at 189.
283 Noise Reduction Kits ("Hush Kits") have been certified by the FAA for the
older DC-8-62 engines. These kits reduce takeoff noise from 111.0 EPNdB to
101.7 EPNdB, well under the maximum 103.8 EDNdB allowed. FAA Certificates
Noise Reduction Kits for McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62s, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct.
14, 1985, at 49.
284 Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 189.
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charges, already exists. 285  Funds collected for noise
charges either could be surrendered to the local jurisdic-
tion or retained by airports in a fund to compensate prop-
erty owners who sue to recover for property damage.286
Such charges would not be inconsistent with airline de-
regulation and would in fact promote it.2 87 Nor does it
appear that noise charges conflict with existing federal
statutes. 288 Each airline, without regulatory direction or
restriction, would be free to choose its own means of re-
ducing or paying for noise. The carrier could select either
quieter planes for more noise-sensitive airports, or could
choose to fly during less noise-sensitive times of day.28 9
Airlines without the more modern, quieter aircraft could
choose takeoff and landing procedures that work to re-
duce noise. 29 °
Since a system of noise fees by necessity must be uni-
form and non-discriminatory, 9' federal (FAA) adminis-
tration would be required. Far from imposing additional
regulations, however, such a system would eliminate the
need for federal regulations. In addition, it would elimi-
28- Both Washington National and Manchester (England) International Airports
have had noise monitoring systems in place for years. Id.
286 DOJ Comments, AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 63.
287 Id. at 64.
288 The Airport Acceleration Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(b) (1982) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, nothing in this
section shall prohibit a State ... from the levy or collection of taxes
other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, includ-
ing property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or
use taxes on the sale of goods or services; and nothing in this section
shall prohibit a State... owning or operating an airport from levy-
ing or collecting reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other ser-
vice charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities.
(emphasis added).
289 A proposed regulation supported by the Airport Operators Council Interna-
tional will phase out the noisiest (state I) aircraft by January 1, 1988, and the next
category (state II) by 1995. However, airlines remain reluctant to make huge fi-
nancial investments for new aircraft without reasonable assurances that they won't
be hamstrung by local airport restrictions. Aviation Daily, Dec. 11, 1985, at 201.
2 0 For example, aircraft could apply takeoff thrust at certain points, or on ap-
proach could maintain above-minimum altitude until glideslope intercept. See
AIRPORT AcCESs REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
29, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,406, 28,417 (1978).
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nate the need for the present patchwork of overlapping,
counterproductive, and self-defeating local restrictions
which not only hold very questionable value in reducing
noise, but which directly impact on interstate commerce
and threaten the free entry indispensable to deregulation
and competition.29 2
C. Scheduling Committee Agreements
Orders issued by CAB prior to its sunset approved a
multitude of agreements, including schedule adjustment
agreements at various airports and agreements granting
antitrust immunity under section 414 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act.293 In many orders, the CAB recognized that
such agreements and discussions "could have substantial
and adverse effect on competition. ' 294 DOT, however, has
suggested that because such discussions were "voluntary,
and because carriers did not discuss city-pairs, an adverse
effect on competition was 'minimized', if not
eliminated.' '295
Most airports in the country have negotiating commit-
tees open to all regularly scheduled airlines serving the
292 AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 48-51.
293 The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1384 (1982) provides that
the Board may, as part of such order, exempt any person affected by
such order from the operations of the "antitrust laws" set forth in
[the Clayton Act] to the extent necessary to enable such person to
proceed with the transaction specifically approved by the Board in
such order and those transactions necessarily contemplated by such
order, except that the Board may not exempt such person unless it
determines that such exemption is required in the public interest.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, on the basis of the findings
required by subsection (a)(2)(A)(i) of section 412 149 U.S.C.S.
§ 1482(a)(2)(A)(i)], the Board shall, as part of any order under such
section which approves any contract, agreement, or request or any
modification or cancellation thereof, exempt any person affected by
such order from the operations of the "antitrust laws" set forth in
[the Clayton Act] to the extent necessary to enable such person to
proceed with the transaction specifically approved by the Board in
such order and with those transactions necessarily contemplated by
such order.
CAB Order No. 84-10-120 at 2 (Oct. 25, 1984); CAB Order No. 80-9-100 at
5 (Sept. 17, 1980).
29- CAB Order No. 84-10-120 at 8 (Oct. 25, 1984).
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airport, and these committees provide the principal
means for presenting the airlines' position on airport af-
fairs.2 96 The 1983 Airport Access Report found that "ne-
gotiating committees at many airports may exert
substantial influence in virtually all aspects of airport af-
fairs and also may be subject to antitrust scrutiny. '2 97 In
that respect, such committees serve functions analogous
to those served by "majority in interest" clauses in some
airport leases.298
Negotiating committees provided a convenient way of
allocating airport space during regulation. After deregu-
lation, these committees continued as a convenient means
of access control. 299 As the demand for airport space has
increased over the past few years, however, it has become
apparent that the negotiating system is heavily weighted
in favor of incumbents. This was recognized by the Air-
port Access Task Force, who acknowledged that "negoti-
ating committees may tend to protect the rights of
existing carriers and make the admission of new carriers
to the community serving the airport more difficult. 30 0
Airline scheduling committees were created in 1968301
to allocate scarce slots among incumbent airlines at five
slot-constrained airports.3 °2 These agreements were im-
munized from antitrust scrutiny under section 414 of the
Federal Aviation Act 30 3 and were subject to periodic re-
view before extension. 4 The 1981 PATCO strike re-
quired implementation of the Interim Operations Plan
limiting the number of operations at additional air-
296 AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 79.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 99.
299 The various airlines may exert their collective power over the airport opera-
tor to restrict new entrant access. Id. at 79.
-o Id. at 100.
30, See generally CAB Order No. 68-12-11 (Dec. 3, 1968).
302 This was to implement the FAA's High Density rule initially imposed on
Newark, Washington National, LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy, and O'Hare. See 14
C.F.R. § 93.12 (1968).
303 See Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 770 (1958) (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 414 (1982)).
-o CAB Order No. 68-12-11 at 3 (Dec. 3, 1968).
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ports.3 0 5 Though the PATCO-related constraints were
terminated in August, 1984, Eastern requested carrier dis-
cussions to voluntarily implement control of flight sched-
ules at six airside-congested cities.3 °6 Although CAB
granted the request for antitrust immunity for the pro-
posed agreements from November 1, 1984, to March 31,
1985, °7 the following passage from its order is revealing:
"Specifically at La Guardia, Air Atlanta asks for as short an
approval period as possible. For the past six months, it
has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain slots from the Air-
line Schedule Committee. Despite the existence of
twenty-five unused slots, the committee has been unable
to agree; thus, Air Atlanta's request for ten slots has not
been granted. According to Air Atlanta, approval now
would eliminate any incentive for the committee to meet
and allocate slots. Air Atlanta also asserts that 27 slots re-
main unused even under the agreements submitted."308
In a prior order, the CAB acknowledged that "discus-
sions could reduce competition substantially," but ap-
proved the agreements on the ground that "serious
transportation needs and public benefits, combined with
the lack of reasonably available, less anti-competitive al-
ternatives, justifies their approval. 30 9
Scheduling agreements were a viable means of allocat-
ing airport slots during economic regulation. CAB policy
prevented entry by new firms, so there existed a lesser
need for rationing. The anti-competitive effects of such
agreements also posed little concern since CAB already
had a policy of preventing any competition from new en-
trants.3 1 0 Under economic deregulation, however, sched-
uling agreements conflict with the policies and objectives
305 See generally CAB Order No. 81-10-162 (Oct. 27, 1981).
5- CAB Order No. 84-10-120 at 9 (Oct. 25, 1984). These included Denver,
Atlanta, O'Hare, JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark. Id.
307 Id. at 9. The CAB, however, promised review if there was evidence that pas-
sengers were not suffering delays which would justify such approval. Id.
3-8 Id. at 4-5.
-o CAB Order No. 84-8-129 at 9 (Aug. 31, 1984).
310 See Hardaway, supra note 39, at 134-51.
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of the Airline Deregulation Act.31 1 Although allowing air-
lines to collude on slots does not stifle competition to the
same degree as price-fixing, such collusion prevents free
entry in the long run.
D. Lotteries
Since scheduling agreements require unanimity, 31 2 a
problem arises when the participants reach deadlock. 3
Although the ATA pledged to develop an effective dead-
lock-breaking mechanism in 198 1,3 4 to date that has not
occurred with the trunk carriers.3 5 On June 7, 1984, the
FAA proposed a deadlock-breaking mechanism. 6 Under
that proposal, incumbents would maintain previously allo-
cated slots.3 1 7 After being notified of deadlock and after
essential air service requirements were fulfilled, the FAA
would determine the order of slot selection by a random
lottery.1 8 New entrants would be eligible, but only for
15% of each classification of slots. 3 9 Further, slots not
used within sixty days of the lottery by existing carriers or
new entrants would be lost.320 The FAA Buy-Sell Rule
now provides for withdrawal of up to 5% of air carrier
slots for purposes of redistribution by lottery at high-den-
sity airports. 21
Some regional and commuter agreements already have
purported to accommodate new entry demand by provid-
1, In 1982, DOJ asserted that scheduling agreements were anti competitive. See
47 Fed. Reg. 29,814 (1982). Proponents of market force distribution of slots
maintain that such agreements present an insuperable barrier to new entrants. Id.
at 29,814-15.
312 See CAB Order No. 83-6-43 at 10 (June 3, 1983).
313 For example, the inability of scheduling committees to agree to slot alloca-
tion simply leaves slots in the same hands. See Ott, U.S. Reviews Airport Slot Policy,
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 16, 1984, at 32.
314 CAB Order No. 81-10-162 at 4 (Oct. 27, 1981).
3- See generally Subcommittee Testimony, supra note 227.
316 See 49 Fed. Reg. 23,806 (1984).
317 See id. at 23,807.
318 See id.
si See id. at 23,808.
320 Id.
321 See 14 C.F.R. § 93 (1985).
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ing a deadlock lottery when voluntary schedule adjust-
ments cannot be made. 22 In practice, however, these
lotteries provide new entrants with only an arbitrarily set,
and usually small number, of slots.3 23 While CAB Order
84-6-17 approved, for an interim period, three scheduling
committee agreements, the order also recognized that
the agreements are ultimately likely to perpetuate existing
slot allocations. In the event of a deadlock, there would
be no allocation of slots at JFK, and the lotteries at ORD
[Chicago] and LGA [LaGuardia] cover only newly created
slots. This is "grandfathering," a practice we condemned
under section 412 as a substantially anticompetitive
practice.324
In fact, this flawed grandfathering approach could act to
encourage incumbents to reach deadlocks, thereby limit-
ing airport expansion and inflating the value of airport
slots. 325
Even if lotteries allocated existing utilized slots as well
as the more limited number of "available" slots, 32 6 the
author submits that such a method of airport space alloca-
tion would be economically inefficient and inconsistent
with airline deregulation. Such a lottery presumably
would give the appearance of offering new entrants a
chance to obtain a slot. It was not the purpose of airline
deregulation, however, to grant economic favors, even by
chance, to incumbents or new entrants. Deregulation in-
stead seeks to allow development of an economic environ-
ment in which efficiency, good service, and low fares
produce economic rewards, while inefficiency, poor ser-
vice, and high fees subject an airline to economic punish-
322 See, e.g., CAB Order No. 84-6-17 at 1 (June 8, 1984); CAB Order No. 83-6-
43 at 1-3 (June 15, 1983).
" See CAB Order No. 84-6-17 at 1 (June 8, 1984).
324 CAB Order No. 84-6-17 at 8 (June 8, 1984).
"2 See Subcommittee Testimony, supra note 227.
326 The slots would either be unused or become available as a result of the "use
it or lose it" provision, a provision which the CAB found was not adverse to the
public interest. CAB Order No. 84-6-17 at 9 (June 8, 1984).
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ment.3 7 The lottery system, regardless of scope, fails
utterly in this task. Such a system allocates economically
valuable airport space not on the basis of efficiency or ser-
vice, but by the roll of the dice. This seems even less ra-
tional than previous CAB policy under regulation, which
at least paid lip service to awarding slots or routes on a
"public interest" basis, if not an efficiency basis.328
When the question of lotteries arises, it brings to mind
the lottery system of military punishment used during
World War I as dramatized in Stanley Kubrick's film, Paths
of Glory. In that film, several thousand soldiers refused to
obey a general staff order to make a suicidal charge
against entrenched enemy positions. Since the military
authorities could not realistically execute several thou-
sand soldiers for disobedience, the military held a lottery
to select three unlucky individual soldiers for execution.
Lotteries for airport access are equally irrational and
unfair. The CAB expressed hope that discussions among
airlines would be productive, so that airlines could avoid
the randomness of the deadlock-breaking mechanism. 29
Nevertheless, lotteries have been deemed an essential
safety valve for situations in which scheduling committee
members with unequal bargaining positions cannot agree
on a schedule. 33 0 The sole merit of a lottery system, how-
ever, lies in its equally irrational treatment of all appli-
cants, precluding any one carrier from a deliberate
discrimination argument. In light of the millions of dol-
lars wasted each year due to misallocation of airport re-
sources, such a policy hardly seems a fitting premise for
allocation by lottery.
327 The DOT, for example, has rejected the broad use of lotteries as too ran-
dom and too disruptive. See Ott, Economy Council Pushes Sale of Busy Airport Landing
Slots, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 11, 1985, at 39.
528 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
320 CAB Order No. 83-6-43 at 13 (June 3, 1983).
,-o Even CAB once stated that, despite reservations, it would not intervene as
long as all carriers had a chance of getting slots through a lottery. CAB Order No.
84-8-24 at 5 (Aug. 6, 1984).
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E. "First Come, First Served"
Some airports apply the general policy of "first come,
first served" to allocate slots. At Stapleton Airport in
Denver, for example, aircraft purportedly merely wait
their turn in line to obtain runway space.3 3' In fact and as
already noted, however, the limiting factor at such air-
ports is not "slots" per se but, more particularly, gates
and terminal space.332 In other words, without possession
of a gate, an airline cannot "get in line."
In any case, a "first come, first served" system does not
offer an economically efficient means of allocating slots.
To grant a valuable slot based upon who has wasted the
most time in line proves even less rational than a chance-
based lottery system for slot allocation. In fact, a time-
priority system actually encourages the inefficient use of
time and facilities, not to mention fuel.333 Stapleton Air-
port officials estimated that delays under such a system
cost airlines $104 million in 1985 alone.334 Furthermore,
this method does nothing to alleviate the peak-hour
bunching problem at airside-congested airports.
F. Administrative Regulation
The legal basis for administrative allocation of airport
slots already has been discussed.3 5 Under economic reg-
ulation, CAB substituted the views of its members for
those of the airlines and the public. In the same manner,
administrative regulation and allocation of airport slots
involves substitution of a bureaucratic "public interest"
determination for the actual views of the public and air-
-3, Under this method, when the ceiling has been reached for each hour, planes
are either stacked to the next hour or diverted to other airports. CAB Order No.
80-9-148 at 7 (Sept. 24, 1980).
332 See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
333 A B-727 burns approximately 80 pounds (12 gallons) of fuel per minute
waiting for takeoff at a cost of $9.75 per minute. Interview with Bruce Burrows,
Training/Check Manager, United Airlines Training Center, Denver, Colo. (Dec.
17, 1985).
3- Rocky Mountain News, Mar. 6, 1986, at 7, col. 4.
35 See supra notes 184-229 and accompanying text.
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lines as manifested by what they buy and sell in the mar-
ketplace.3 36 Administrative regulation also involves the
cumbersome process of administrative hearings and pro-
ceedings that further inhibits the free market as it did
under the years of CAB regulation. Moreover, neither
FAA, DOT, nor the carriers presently seek or desire such
regulation. 37 Indeed, evidence suggests that several air-
port scheduling committee agreements were reached only
because many members believed the alternative was ad-
ministrative regulation.3 8 In Order 84-8-129, the CAB
stated that "government interference with carrier sched-
uling must be kept at a minimum. ' 33 9 In a subsequent
order, the CAB repeated that position and further es-
poused the view that FAA regulation of carrier schedules
did indeed adversely affect competition. 40 In a concur-
ring opinion, CAB Chairman Dan McKinnon stated that
congestion at six airports had become so severe that anti-
trust immunity would be needed to see if the carriers
could voluntarily cooperate to solve the problem through
scheduling agreements. 34' The government granted anti-
trust immunity only because "[t]he alternative could be a
frustrated public that eventually could demand a return to
some form of re-regulation or another government
agency forcefully regulating airline actions without con-
cern for the benefits of competition. "342 In sum, adminis-
trative regulation of airport slots offers the least viable,
and certainly least palatable, method of slot allocation.
G. Variable Landing Fees
Airports, both domestic and international,343 impose a
336 Hardaway, supra note 39, at 134-51.
-, See 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968).
338 See, e.g., CAB Order No. 68-12-11 at 4 (Dec. 3, 1968).
-9 CAB Order No. 84-8-129 at 11 (Aug. 31, 1984).
340 CAB Order No. 84-10-120 at 8 (Oct. 25, 1984).
341 Id. at 10.
542 Id.
343 For a discussion of differential and peak charges at European airports, see
generally C. Phillips (Chief Economist, Finance British Airport Authority), Differ-
ential and Peak Charges, AOCI, International Airport Economic Subcomm. Working
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wide variety of landing fees,3 44 property taxes,345 noise
charges,3 46 and service charges.3 4 7 The kind of charge im-
posed depends largely upon political factors existing at
each airport. In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dis-
trict v. Delta Airlines,348 for example, a local airport in Indi-
ana charged a flat fee based on passengers enplaned.3 49 A
local airport in New Hampshire charged a fee based on
the number of passengers enplaning on aircraft of specific
weights. 350  Logan International Airport imposed noise
charges based on decibel levels and flight times.351  A sur-
vey of noise charges at twenty-three major airports shows
charges per operation ranging from .82 cents in Portland
to $196.67 at Laguardia. s52 Airports have charged a flat
passenger embarkation fee,3 5 3 a flat fee on aircraft move-
ments,354 a fee based on the weight of aircraft, 55 a fee
based on distance,3 56 and fees based on time of landing
and departure. 5 7
Fees at domestic airports have been restrained by the
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982.58 This act
Paper, Nov. 26-28, 1984; C. Phillips, Towards Cost Relating Pricing, in Polytechnic of
Central London Airport Economic and Finance Short Course; Nierenberg, supra
note 256, at 97; S. Dempsey, Deregulation, Discrimination and Dispute Resolu-
tion in International Aviation: Turbulence in the Open Skies (1986) (unpublished
monograph).
-4 See Levine, supra note 3, at 90-102.
-4- See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1943).
346 Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 185, identifies three types of noise charges:
(1) revenue-generating charges; (2) compliance-related charges; and (3) damage-
related charges.
347 See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405
U.S. 707, 709 (1972).
-8 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
34o Id. at 709.
-o Id. at 710.
-"' Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 187.
352 Id. at 207.
-53 Evansville, 405 U.S. at 710.
35 See, e.g., id.; Northwest Airlines v. Joint City-County Airport Board, 154
Mont. 352, 463 P.2d 470 (1979); Allegheny Airlines v. Sills, 110 NJ. Super. 54,
264 A.2d 268 (1970).
355 See Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 97.
356 Id.
317 See Nierenberg, supra note 256, at 168.
358 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2201-25 (1982).
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requires, as a precondition to approval of an airport de-
velopment project, that the airport be "administered in a
manner [consistent with the goals] of fostering competi-
tion, preventing unfair methods of competition in air
transportation, maintaining essential air transportation,
and preventing unjust and discriminatory practices. 3 59
Airport fees also are subject to Commerce Clause re-
straints as set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Evansville.360 Specifically, airport fees must not discrimi-
nate between interstate and intrastate flights36' and must
reflect "a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of
facilities for whose benefits they are imposed. 3 62 Fur-
ther, fees must "not be excessive in relation to costs in-
curred by the taxing authorities. ' 63 The fact that airport
fees meet constitutional standards, however, does not in-
sure that such fees result in optimum allocation. Indeed,
an optimum method may run afoul of one or more of the
Evansville requirements. 3 4
Economic studies severely criticize the present system
of landing fees based on a flat rate per landing,365 aircraft
weight, 366 passenger embarkation, 367 type of aircraft, 368 or
fuel flowage.369 In his groundbreaking article, Landing
I~ ld. at § 2202(a)(5).
360 Evansville, 405 U.S. at 717. See infra notes 361-363 and accompanying text.
36, Id. (citing Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946)).
362 Id.
363 Id. No violation of the Commerce Clause occurs if the airport fees imposed
are "reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical stan-
dard." Id. at 713.
- The problem with the Evansville requirements, from an economic stand-
point, is that they relate only to the cost side of the equation. The requirements
fail to consider that an optimum price for slots and gates must reflect their scarcity
value. A price which reflects scarcity value may appear excessive under the Evans-
ville standards. See supra note 112.
363 Levine, supra note 3, at 102 n.6; see generally Steiner, Peak Loads and Efficient
Pricing, 71 Qj. EcON. 585 (1957); Grampp, An Economic Remedy for Airport Conges-
tion: The Case for Flexible Pricing, 9 Bus. HORIZONS 21 (1968).
366 Levine, supra note 3, at 90.
367 Id. at 101.
-6 Id. at 90.
s6 Id. at 94.
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Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem,37° Michael Levine
summed up the economic inefficiencies of the common
types of landing fees. For example, fees based on weight
cause
maximizing airline[s] [to] schedul[e] as many flights as
possible at peak hours. Since the airline will experience
the average, rather than the marginal, delay, measuring
the cost to the airline of adding the schedule against the
incremental revenue will yield a more favorable result
than would be the case if the costs to all users were taken
into account.3 7'
The flat rate system
does not allow those airlines who prefer to schedule
tightly and increase aircraft utilization the opportunity to
use the savings possible from this method to buy the de-
lay-free operations which are a precondition to full imple-
mentation of that policy. It delays equally long-haul
passengers who have few substitutes for air travel and
short-haul passengers who have many.3 72
Fuel flowage fees
encourage the most frivolous airport uses: the recreational
flight for lunch or a cup of coffee, the short trip to pick up
or drop off a passenger who could have made the trip by
surface, the instructional approach and landing to give the
student a taste of operating at a busy airport.373
370 Id.; see also Kahn, Raise the Cost of Landing at Peak Hours, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1984, at 2F, col. 2.
371 Levine, supra note 3, at 91.
372 Id. at 92.
37, Id. at 94. Levine notes that embarkation fees do not
measure with any precision the use made of the airport's landing
area by the aircraft in which the passengers are carried. They result
in smaller aggregate charges being assessed against unpopular
flights than against popular ones-precisely the opposite of the ef-
fect desired at peak hours when capacity is of prime value.
The second unfortunate effect, which follows from the first, is that
the cross-subsidy of landing areas from revenues extracted from ter-
minal concessions results in distortions of demand which in turn
produce investment mistakes. Lowering prices on landing areas cre-
ates a higher demand for those facilities-demand which, as we have
seen, does not necessarily produce increased terminal revenues to
finance the facilities required to accommodate it. Using passengers
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Levine, like other economists, recognizes that landing
fees can serve far higher purposes than raising revenue;
namely, reducing congestion and increasing economic ef-
ficiency. Levine recognizes, however, that landing fees
necessary to accomplish these purposes "may require
higher-than-cost prices. 374 For this reason, such fees
must be scrutinized closely in light of Evansville. The ex-
perience of the New York Port Authority illustrates the
capacity of landing fees to reduce congestion. In 1968,
the latter authority imposed higher fees on peak-hour
general aviation use of runways, resulting in a 30% de-
cline in use of high-peak slots.3 7 5
H. Slot Exchanges, Sales, and Auctions
Under Special Federal Aviation Regulations 44 through
44-3,376 the FAA for some time permitted slot exchanges
on a one-for -one basis. In the FAA's view, slot exchanges
increase scheduling flexibility among carriers, but still do
not adequately meet scheduling needs. As stated by the
FTC at a hearing before the FAA: "[E]lementary eco-
nomic principles demonstrate ... that an exchange sys-
tem that permits only barter is inferior to one that allows
as a "meter" creates incentives for frequent scheduling of lightly-
loaded aircraft....
Finally, by raising the prices of concession-supplied services, this
policy deprives consumers of the full utility they might derive from
using them at competitive prices.
Id. at 101.
'74 Id. at 88. As Levine explains:
In such instances, there is a question (partially political rather than
economic in nature) as to who should capture the profit. But using
this criterion it is less than obvious that airlines are more worthy
beneficiaries than taxpayers at large, especially where giving the
profit to airlines in the form of reduced landing fees may defeat the
very purpose of extracting it; that is, to allocate the use of scarce
airport resources. In any case, the profit should be only as large as is
necessary to accomplish the rationing and the purpose which engen-
dered it should not be vitiated by the way in which it is distributed.
Id.
Id75 d. at 90.
376 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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both barter and cash sales. ' 77
As a result, in May of 1982, the FAA approved a six-
week experimental program permitting slot sales. 8 Un-
fortunately, the short duration of this program made it
impossible to draw any firm conclusions. Several hundred
slots did trade hands during this period.3 79 New entrants,
such as People Express, were able to purchase a large
number of slots at National Airport, from which they pre-
viously had been excluded. 8 ° Indeed, the success of Peo-
ple Express in obtaining slots so pleased that airline that it
since has testified vigorously for Buy-Sell at subsequent
hearings on slot allocation procedures. 81 People Express
believes that the only way to achieve access to additional
slots is through a slot sale program, and the airline credits
the experimental program with allowing it to continue op-
erating under the high-density restrictions imposed in the
aftermath of the PATCO strike. The People Express ex-
perience exemplifies the fact that inferior economic power
alone will not prevent acquisition of slots.
In short, the little data available from the 1982 slot sale
experiment is positive: at least one new entrant obtained
access and was not outbid by firms with far greater assets.
The experience from gate subleasing, however, offers less
encouragment and suggests that Buy-Sell may provide
greater anti-competitive incentives than have been recog-
nized by FAA.382
377 FTC REPORT OF THE AIR FORCE TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 3.
378 See 47 Fed. Reg. 25,508 (1982).
379 AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
380 Id.
38, Id.
382 It should be noted that Buy-Sell differs from the mere auction of slots. Auc-
tions would begin the allocation process at base zero, retrieving all slots and then
selling them to the highest bidder. Buy-Sell "grandfathers" existing slots and
merely permits existing slot owners to sell as they see fit. The FAA has rejected
slot auction proposals on several grounds, including unresolved legal questions
and the possibility of service disruptions during transition. See 50 Fed. Reg.
52,183-86 (1985).
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VII. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT UNDER SLOT SALES
The FAA Comments to the Buy-Sell Rule confidently
state, "[T]he use-or-lose provisions of the rule, in con-
junction with existing antitrust laws, will be sufficient to
deter anti-competitive behavior. ' 383 However, the com-
ments do not specify which antitrust provision(s) apply.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize ... any part of the trade or
commerce. . . shall be punished .... ,,384 In early 1985,
the DOJ set forth "Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 3 85 ex-
plaining DOJ enforcement policy under this section:
[V]ertical restraints - particularly, exclusive dealing -
may have the effect of excluding rivals by prohibitively
raising either their cost of a vital input or their cost of dis-
tribution.... Alternatively, a firm... may enter into long-
term exclusive contracts for the supply of a vital input,
leaving little or no present production of the input for new
entrants or fringe firms. In the short run, a rival firm
would be unable to obtain a sufficient amount of the input
to allow it to operate .... 386
The DOJ guidelines set forth three criteria for deter-
mining whether or not anti-competitive exclusion exists:
(1) The "nonforeclosed market" is concentrated and
leading firms in the market use the restraints;
(2) the firms subject to the restraints control a large share
of the "foreclosed market"; and
(3) entry into the "foreclosed market" is difficult. 387
Although written before Buy-Sell, these guidelines appear
applicable to circumstances that might arise under that
Rule. Most case law under section 2 of the Sherman Act is
not precisely on point. Several cases, however, provide a
possible basis for antitrust enforcement against anti-com-
petitive behavior during Buy-Sell.
383 Id. at 52,186.
384 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
s85 50 Fed. Reg. 6,263 (1985).
386 Id. at 6,267.
,87 Id.
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In the leading case of United States v. Terminal Railroad
Association of St. Louis 38 the Supreme Court struck down a
scheme by which large railroads took control of a central
railroad terminal in St. Louis and excluded competitors
from its use. 389 Likewise, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States3 90 the Supreme Court found a violation of the Sher-
man Act when a dominant power company used its eco-
nomic power to "foreclose potential entrants into the
retail arena from obtaining electric power from outside
sources of supply. ' 391 In In re Carterfone,3 92 the FCC held
that AT&T could prevent connection of competitive lines
to its system only if the devices would cause harm to the
system. 93
The fact that some antitrust precedent exists for action
against carriers using Buy-Sell for anti-competitive pur-
poses, however, does not mean that a practical method of
enforcement easily could be devised. The airline industry
stands distinct in two particulars: (1) demand for the in-
dustry's product is highly elastic394 (that is, a 1% reduc-
tion in fares likely will result in a greater than 1% increase
in demand) 395 ; and (2) the industry's product is highly
perishable, making the industry especially sensitive to
price competition by even relatively small competitors. 9 6
Even temporary exclusion from a market can have imme-
diate and devastating effects. A firm may cease to exist
long before antitrust protection becomes available.
388 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See supra note 249 for a summary of the facts and hold-
ing in the St. Louis Terminal case.
389 224 U.S. at 399, 401.
' o 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Id. at 377.
392 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968).
-3 Id. at 424.
3' See S. BREYER, supra note 61, at 205.
P9 p. SAMUELSON, supra note 60, at 359-64.
'9 See CAB STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 n.17:
Low, unrestricted fares were available only in a limited number of
markets in 1979 and the beginning of 1980. At that time, these low
fares often resulted from the entry of another carrier. For example,
the fare in Denver-Salt Lake fell by 62 percent when Texas Interna-
tional entered the market.
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In addition, difficult questions will arise in determining
whether an antitrust violation has occurred. For example,
there appears no easy answer as to whether a large car-
rier, who operates a flight from a particular slot at a very
marginal profit because of high labor costs, engages in
anti-competitive conduct by simply refusing to sell at any
price to a small competitor, who because of its lower costs
can reap a higher profit from use of the slot, but whose
lower fares threaten to take passengers from the large car-
riers. In other words, could a large carrier keep a
"grandfathered" slot for which it has made a considerable
investment over the years, in order to flatten its own indi-
vidual demand curve, and thus reap an oligopoly profit? If
not, how would such a motive be proven, and what stan-
dards would apply? Areeda and Turner point out that oli-
gopoly pricing below marginal costs may be justified and
not predatory under certain circumstances, such as where
a competitive response is required or where the price is
set for promotional purposes. 9 7 For this reason, these au-
thors suggest that "extreme care be taken" in formulating
antitrust rules on predatory pricing.398 The same also can
be said with regard to formulation of antitrust rules under
Buy-Sell. Ideally, a Buy-Sell system should incorporate an
internal market-based mechanism to deter anti competi-
tive behavior without sole resort to antitrust law
enforcement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Existing methods of airport resource allocation are un-
satisfactory. Administrative regulation has proven cum-
bersome and inefficient. Scheduling committees inhibit
free entry, and discourage competition and efficiency.
Lotteries are irrational, inefficient and unfair. "First
come, first served" results in waste and misallocation of
397 Areeda & Turner, supra note 137, at 705-15.
39a Id. at 699.
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resources. Only variable landing fees and Buy-Sell prom-
ise to allocate resources at an efficient level.
The case for variable landing fees has been persuasively
documented.39 9 Such fees have the added advantage of
providing a working solution to the airport noise prob-
lem, since noise abatement incentives can be built into the
fees.40 0 For example, air carriers who control noise by op-
erating quieter aircraft or operating during less noise-sen-
sitive times of day can be rewarded by lower fees. Air
carriers who choose to operate noisy aircraft or choose to
operate at noise-sensitive times would be subject to a
higher fee. That part of a fee based on noise could be
placed in a compensation fund for surrounding landown-
ers who suffer actual loss in value to their property. Such a
system recognizes noise control as an economic cost.
Variable fees also can provide economic incentives to
use low-peak slots, thus eliminating congestion and re-
ducing costly delays. Negative fees (subsidies) might even
be awarded to carriers who use extremely low-peak slots.
Fees for high-peak slots simply would be raised to the
point at which carriers willing to pay the fees equal the
number of slots available. Thus, variable fees may be used
to ration slots to those carriers who value the slots most
highly. A slot used by a jumbo jet with 500 people
aboard, for example, will command a higher fee than a
recreational flier in a Piper Cub would be willing to pay.
A market mechanism that gives preference to the interests
of 500 people over one person reflects greater allocative
efficiency. (If political pressures demand preference for
general aviation, reduced fees or subsidies could benefit
general aviation or commuters.)
To avoid the possibility that some carriers might choose
to cross-subsidize high-peak flights by refusing to include
the higher landing fees in ticket prices, the landing fees
could be imposed directly on passengers as a high-peak
3- See generally AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 62. Nierenberg, supra
note 256; Kahn, supra note 370.
4- AIRPORT ACCESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 62.
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surcharge. In this manner, a business passenger who val-
ues a high-peak departure time could obtain his preferred
flight, but would have to pay for it. The recreational pas-
senger would get a less desirable departure time, but
would pay a lower price. In this manner, direct as well as
indirect economic pressure would prompt carriers to shift
lower valued flights to low-peak slots.
Variable landing fees have two important limitations,
however: (1) they do nothing to solve the problem of air-
port access to terminal space and gates, and thus they
serve only to even out high-and low-peak usage by carri-
ers already possessing terminal and gate space; and (2)
they do not allow for long-term scheduling guarantees.
But Buy-Sell also has two critical weaknesses: (1) It cre-
ates an economic incentive for large carriers to outbid
small carriers for anti-competitive purposes401 ; and (2)
like variable fees, Buy-Sell fails to address free entry to
terminal space and gates.
The first weakness of Buy-Sell can be cured by assessing
a variable landing fee per operation to each slot available
for "purchase." A high landing fee will make an other-
wise prime slot less desirable, thereby reducing the anti-
competitive incentive to purchase it. A high landing fee
also can serve to offset the "oligopoly surplus" that the
large carrier otherwise would earn while in possession of
the slot.
To ensure free entry, a certain percentage of slots
should be recalled for redistribution. Redistribution of
these slots will flatten the slope of the demand curve for
larger firms, thus lessening the anti-competitive incentive
to corner a slot. The FAA Buy-Sell Rule attempts to ac-
complish this result by lottery.40 2 As noted, however, a
lottery offers an inefficient means of initial allocation since
it makes no distinction between carriers who place differ-
ent values on the slot. Of course, once slot allocation oc-
curs (by whatever means), a slot after-market eventually
401 See supra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
402 See 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180 at 52,193 (1985).
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will put slots to work where they will do the most good.
But this does not justify allocation by chance in the first
instance.
The author submits that a system of efficiency bidding
provides a far better means of distributing available
slots.4 0 3 In such a bidding system, a certain percentage of
slots (say 5% of each incumbents' slots, plus any other
slots made available by new construction or returns to the
slot pool) could be made available for auction on a quar-
terly basis. Unlike the DOJ system of selling to the carrier
offering the most cash, or the Buy-Sell system of distribu-
tion by lottery, an efficiency bidding system would allo-
cate slots to the carrier offering to provide air service to
the public for the lowest cost. A formula could be devised
to incorporate a fare/mileage equivalency table, equating
long-and short-haul fares, so that fare bids for long-haul
routes would not be unfairly compared to fare bids for
short-haul routes.40 4 Bid winners would receive a slot for
the time periods indicated in the bid or for a predeter-
mined length of time (perhaps six months or a year), after
which the slot would revert to the original owner if previ-
ously owned or to the slot pool if not previously owned. 5
Remaining time periods available for the slot would go to
the next highest bidder or would be returned to the auc-
tion pool. If the winning bidder raises the fare during the
period awarded, any competitor who previously entered a
bid could, within one week of the fare increase, demand
that the slot be returned to the auction pool. Fares could
be lowered, of course, without consequence. A winning
bidder could change the route indicated without penalty
as long as the fare for the new route was less than the fare
403 See Hardaway, Airport Slot Allocation in a Deregulated Industry: The Quest for a
"Reasonably Available, Least Anticompetitive" Alternative Solution, in AVIATION HEAR-
INGS, supra note 4, at 175.
4- Such a formula also might take into account past public demand for the
route proposed in the bid, as indicated by objective statistical data. But the
formula should not reflect the formulator's opinion as to what routes should be
flown.
405 Slots obtained through condemnation procedures could, of course, simply
revert to the slot pool and not to the original owner.
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for the old route under the formula's fare/mileage
equivalency table. Winning bidders would be required to
pay the prevailing variable fee for the slot awarded. All
bidders, of course, would be required to meet FAA safety,
capital, and other requirements presently needed for
certification.
The danger always exists, of course, that any devised
formula under such a system could be misused to rein-
state, in disguised form, administrative regulation. A
formula incorporating government authorities' views and
opinions as to routes or service to small communities, for
example, could be used to achieve such a result.40 6 The
system proposed here, however, would utilize a formula
incorporating a factor already voted upon by consumers
under economic deregulation, namely price.
The success of a bid system, of course, would depend
upon the establishment of a non-discriminatory and anon-
ymous bidding system. Even if formulators insisted on in-
cluding factors such as service to small communities, the
system proposed still provides a reasonably available and
least anti-competitive method of allocating recaptured
slots.
While true that some administrative input would be re-
quired in devising the initial formula and overseeing the
bidding system, efficiency bidding otherwise would be as
self-regulating and free from the need for government in-
terference as Buy-Sell itself. Based on objective data and
criteria, an efficiency bidding system would "mirror" the
free market and provide the same economic incentives
that exist in the airline industry as a whole under deregu-
lation. The author recognizes that no efficiency bidding
formula would be able to distinguish between levels of in-
flight service. It is submitted, however, that such a means
of distributing a certain percentage of recalled slots still
would be preferable to the indiscriminate allocation of a
4-' Indeed, administrators under regulation accomplished similar subjective re-
sults while purporting to apply "public interest" formulae in awarding routes. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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lottery. Unlike lotteries, a bid system avoids the likeli-
hood of allocation to the very carriers for whom Buy-Sell
creates an anti-competitive incentive.
The second weakness of Buy-Sell, failure to address
gate and terminal space free-entry problems, can be cured
only by: (1) expansion of airport facilities; (2) condemna-
tion of existing terminal space or leasehold interests for
redistribution purposes (with fair compensation paid for
the value of the property seized); and (3) application of
Buy-Sell to terminal space. Gates would be treated as slots
or as paired with slots (i.e., only for particular time peri-
ods), and could be sold or leased only as slots. Variable
use fees then should be imposed according to the high-or
low-peak use of the gate. As with slots, a certain percent-
age of gate space would be recalled for distribution by ef-
ficiency bidding.
The inefficiencies in airport allocating methods cost air-
lines and consumers billions of dollars each year. Buy-
Sell will go far to reduce this waste. Integration of varia-
ble fees, efficiency bidding, and application of Buy-Sell to
terminal space and gates will further reduce waste and in-
crease economic efficiency.
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